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“IS MINNESOTA PROGRESSIVE?” A FOCUS ON
SEXUALLY ORIENTED EXPRESSION†
By Nadine Strossen††
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ................................................ 54
A. Inherent Subjectivity in Defining “Progressive,” Including
in This Context ...................................................................... 54
† This article is dedicated to Don and Arvonne Fraser, lifelong champions
of progressive values, including free speech and women’s rights, in their home
state of Minnesota, as well as nationally and internationally.
†† Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil
Liberties Union. For research assistance with this article, I gratefully acknowledge:
my Chief Aide, Steven Cunningham (NYLS ‘99); my Assistant, Danica Rue (NYLS
‘09); my Research Assistants Jackie Ferrari (NYLS ‘08) and Trisha Olson (NYLS
‘08); and William Mitchell Law Review Staff Members: Stephanie Friedland (WMCL
‘07), Monica Kelley (WMCL ‘07), and Michael Neaton (WMCL ‘07). They, along
with others of the William Mitchell Law Review, deserve much of the credit, as well
as the responsibility, for many of the footnotes.
For his helpful comments on a draft of this article, I thank Minneapolis
attorney Randall Tigue, a nationally prominent First Amendment expert, who was
directly involved in many of the cases and controversies that this article describes.
I was delighted to accept the invitation to write this article not only
because of my longstanding academic and activist interests in the constitutional
and policy issues concerning sexual expression and feminism, but also given my
close ties to Minnesota. I grew up mostly in Hopkins, having graduated from
Hopkins High School in 1968. Although I went to college and law school outside
Minnesota, and my family had also moved away in 1968, I decided to return to
Minnesota on my own following my law school graduation in 1975. I served as a
law clerk for Justice John J. Todd of the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1975–76. I
then became an associate at the Minneapolis law firm of Lindquist & Vennum,
where one of the clients I helped to represent was the National Football League
Players Association; in that capacity I first met Alan Page, who was then not only an
NFLPA leader and professional football star, but also a law student. Before
becoming a Justice on the Minnesota Supreme Court, Alan Page joined Lindquist
& Vennum, where he occupied the office I had vacated to move to New York City
in 1978 for what I considered a temporary experiment with living in “The Big
Apple.”
Although my experiment with living in NYC is still continuing
successfully, I will always miss Minnesota.
I have the greatest respect for the government officials, judges, lawyers,
and others in Minnesota with whom it was my privilege to work at the outset of my
legal career. I hope and trust that this piece’s constructive criticism of certain
government actions and judicial rulings in my former home state will be accepted
in the respectful spirit in which it is offered.
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My ancestors were Puritans from England, [who] arrived
here in 1648 in the hope of finding greater restrictions
than were permissible under English law at the time.
GARRISON KEILLOR, Minnesota writer and radio
1
producer/performer, 1990
[T]he highly charged context of an obscenity trial may
encourage puritanical . . . views to prevail . . . .
Unproveable aesthetic and moral assumptions may guide
personal decisions, but they should not, even if embraced
by the majority, justify regulation of others’ conduct. Yet
an obscenity trial . . . requires jurors to rely on their moral
assumptions.
ROLAND AMUNDSON, Minnesota Court of Appeals
1. National Endowment for the Arts Grant Funding and Restrictions: Testimony
before Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities, 101st Cong. (1990)
(statement of Garrison Keillor), in CULTURE WARS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECENT
CONTROVERSIES IN THE ARTS 159 (Richard Bolton, ed. 1992).
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2

When I look at this [Minneapolis anti-pornography]
ordinance in relation to the history of women, I am
concerned [about] what it does for feminism and what it
does for the fight for human rights. The status of women
is better in open societies than in closed, restrictive
societies.
KATHY O’BRIEN, Minneapolis City Council Member,
3
1983
In this opinion, the majority [of the Minnesota Supreme
Court] adopts a test for limiting free speech [for nude
dancing] which is a staggering departure from our history
of providing significant protection of individual rights
under the state constitution. To reach this result, the
majority . . . substitutes its own moral judgment for legal
or constitutional analysis.
SANDRA GARDEBRING, Minnesota Supreme Court
4
Justice, 1994
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

A. Inherent Subjectivity in Defining “Progressive,” Including in This
Context
The specific topic the editors have asked me to address—
whether Minnesota policies governing sexual expression are
progressive—exemplifies the inherent ambiguity in this Issue’s key
term, “progressive.” It seems impossible, or at least extremely
difficult, to define this term objectively. After all, it is a variation on

2. State v. Davidson, 471 N.W.2d 691, 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(Amundson, J., concurring specially), rev’d, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1992). The
Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously upheld Minnesota’s law criminalizing
obscenity under the state constitution, rejecting several independently sufficient
state constitutional arguments. 481 N.W.2d at 55–60.
3. Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Essay:
Politics, Feminism, and the
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 642
(1987) (quoting Kathy O’Brien).
4. Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn. 1994)
(Gardebring, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Gardebring joined by two other Justices, making the ruling 4–3).
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the word “progress,” which inevitably reflects subjective perceptions
5
and values. Often, what one person would view, on balance, as
“progress,” another would view as the opposite. For example,
consider the currently raging worldwide debates about
development and globalization. Likewise, even among individuals
and groups who share certain general goals that they would all
consider “progressive”—such as fostering equality, safety, and
dignity for women—there are dramatic disagreements about
whether specific policies actually promote those goals or inhibit
them.
In particular, equally ardent feminists have strongly
disagreed about whether freedom of sexual expression advances or
6
hinders our shared progressive goals.
Along with many other women’s rights advocates, I believe that
all censorship of sexual expression is antithetical to many crucial
progressive goals, including not only women’s rights, but also the
interrelated goals of reproductive freedom and equality for sexualorientation minorities. I support this conclusion by using actual
experience under all such censorial measures, including those
advocated by progressive reformers in the sincere belief that they
would advance progressive goals, including women’s rights.
As I will explain in this article, the many measures suppressing
sexual expression that Minnesota has promoted and adopted
during the past quarter-century—from my anti-censorship, feminist
prospective—are anti-progressive. However, I also recognize that
other sincere advocates of progressive goals would make exactly the
opposite claim; they would hail Minnesota as progressive precisely
because of these censorial measures.
In this Introduction, I will summarize Minnesota’s censorship
policies concerning sexual expression since the early 1980s, and
the reasons why I and many other feminists, as well as advocates of
reproductive freedom, lesbian/gay rights, and civil libertarians,
consider these policies to be regressive. The statements quoted
above, from several Minnesotans who have played leading roles in
these censorship battles, illustrate the broad history of these
repressive measures.
5. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1401 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
the noun “progressive” as “a person who actively favors or strives for progress
toward better conditions”); Definition for “progressive,” http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/progressive (defining “progressive” as “promoting or
favoring progress toward better conditions”) (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
6. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (N.Y. Univ. Press 2000) (1995).
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B. Overview of Minnesota’s Measures Censoring Sexual Expression
During the Past Quarter-Century
Of greatest significance, Minnesota was the scene of the first
so-called “feminist anti-pornography law” passed by any legislative
7
body. I put this law’s label in quotation marks to underscore the
misleading and ambiguous nature of its two key terms. First, the
term “feminist” is misleading, because many feminists strongly
opposed all such laws, specifically on the ground that they would
do more harm than good for women’s rights.
Second, the term “pornography” is ambiguous, having various
denotations and connotations.
According to its dictionary
definition, this word denotes any sexual expression—i.e., any words
8
or images—intended to provoke sexual arousal or desire. In
contrast, the laws in question expressly attached a new definition to
the term “pornography,” to encompass any sexually explicit
expression that is “subordinating,” “dehumanizing,” or “degrading”
9
toward women. The purpose and effect of these laws was to
expand the traditional concept of “obscenity”—the relatively
narrow category of sexually oriented expression that the U.S.
Supreme Court has held to be unprotected by the free speech
10
guarantee in the U.S. Constitution.
Throughout the remainder of this article, I will use the term
“pornography” to refer to any sexual expression that its critics
target for repression because of any alleged adverse impact
resulting from its display or viewing.
As such, the term
encompasses both the traditional legal concept of “obscenity”—
sexual expression that is “patently offensive” to moral values in the
11
local community —and the concept of “pornography” that certain
feminists target as sexual expression that is “degrading” to
7. For a detailed description of the events leading up to the enactment of
this law, as well as its aftermath, see Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3. Although
this self-styled “essay” does not undertake a critical analysis of the law, it sets out
many of the pertinent facts, including the arguments the law’s proponents and
opponents made.
8. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 966 (11th ed. 2003)
(defining “pornography” as “a depiction of erotic behavior (as in writing or
painting) designed to cause sexual excitement”).
9. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., PROPOSED ORDINANCE 83-Or-323 § 3 (1983) (vetoed
by Mayor Donald M. Fraser Jan. 1, 1984 [hereinafter 1983 ORDINANCE]. The
ordinance is attached as an Appendix to this article.
10. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 52–53 (explaining the development of the
Supreme Court’s definition of unprotected “obscenity”).
11. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
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12

women.
In 1983, two University of Minnesota faculty members, law
13
professor Catharine MacKinnon and writer Andrea Dworkin,
drafted a model law that embodied the broad new concept of
constitutionally unprotected sexual expression supported by
14
certain feminists.
The Minneapolis City Council passed this
15
16
model law in 1983, and again in a modified form in 1984.
Although neither such “MacDworkinite” law went into effect in
Minneapolis—thanks to courageous vetoes by Mayor Donald M.
17
Fraser —they served as models to other jurisdictions in the U.S.
18
and abroad, which copied them. These laws are so vague and
sweeping that they endanger all expression with any sexual content,
including expression that is especially valuable to women, sexual19
orientation minorities, and advocates of their rights. Accordingly,
12. I am not discussing the sharply distinguishable concept of child
pornography—sexually explicit expression made with child performers, and which
is targeted for repression because of the adverse impact on such performers that
results from the production process. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S.
234 (2002) (holding the ban on “virtual child pornography” to be
unconstitutionally overbroad as it did not fall under the definition of either “child
pornography” or “obscenity” and it restricted a substantial amount of protected
speech).
13. MacKinnon grew up in Minnesota. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3,
at 613.
14. Id. See also Minneapolis Asked to Attack Pornography as Rights Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1983, at 1–44 [hereinafter Minneapolis Asked to Attack Pornography]
(noting that Dworkin and MacKinnon testified before a City Council committee
against a zoning proposal to remove sexually oriented businesses from certain
neighborhoods, outlining their alternative approach, and persuading Council
members to “prevail[] upon the City Attorney’s office to hire [Dworkin and
MacKinnon] as consultants to draw up [the proposed ordinance] and organize
hearings”).
15. See Minneapolis Gets Rights Law to Ban Pornography, at 1-24 N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1983.
16. See Council Delays Act on Obscene Materials, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER
(Ky.), July 14, 1984, at A3.
17. See Minneapolis Mayor Vetoes Plan Defining Pornography as Sex Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1984, at A11 (quoting Fraser as saying, “I am unwilling to push onto
the courts something which I believe in my own heart may express inappropriate
public policy, simply because it would be expedient to do so, and rely on the
courts to defend our rights”). See also Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 645
(referring to a CITY PAGES column praising Fraser’s political courage and saying
“Fraser was putting his career on the line by vetoing the law”; also referring to an
article in ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS noting “how easy it would have been for Fraser to
sign the bill, appealing to the mass of voters who opposed pornography and
passing the constitutional issues to the courts”).
18. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 77.
19. See infra Part III.C.
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Minnesota earned a spot on the world map as a laboratory that
developed expansive new concepts of government’s censorial
powers, as well as the place that exported these regressive concepts.
Even though the open-ended MacDworkin concept of illegal
sexual expression failed to take root in Minnesota due to the
mayoral vetoes, the state’s subsequent record regarding sexual
expression continues to be far from progressive in two major
respects. First, many Minnesota officials, including judges, have
broadly construed some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial
precedents in this area. These precedents, read into the U.S.
Constitution’s unqualified free speech, guarantee unwritten
exceptions concerning certain sexual expression. Therefore, these
Minnesota officials have taken maximum advantage of the
Supreme Court’s anti-progressive, speech-restricting rulings
20
regarding sexual expression.
Second, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has declined to interpret the Minnesota Constitution’s
21
broadly phrased free speech guarantee as fully extending to
sexual expression. This decision stands even though that state
constitutional guarantee, in contrast with its federal counterpart,
22
expressly protects freedom of expression “on all subjects.”
C. Outline of the Remainder of the Article
Part II of this article summarizes my reasons for concluding
that any measure restricting sexual expression is the opposite of
“progressive”—concerning not only gender equality and equity, but
also other important progressive goals. Part III discusses the
MacDworkinite anti-pornography law, which the Minneapolis City
Council passed twice.
Finally, Part IV outlines subsequent
developments in Minnesota law that continue to undermine
freedom for sexual expression, thereby further undermining
progressive goals.

20. See infra Part IV.A.
21. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The liberty of the press shall forever remain
inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such rights.”).
22. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. CENSORSHIP OF SEXUAL EXPRESSION IS REGRESSIVE, NOT
PROGRESSIVE
A. Freedom of Expression Is an Essential Bedrock for Equality
The arguments about the relationship between freedom of
sexual expression and women’s rights are part of a broader debate
that was emerging among lawyers and others during the last two
decades of the twentieth century. Are freedom and equality
mutually reinforcing goals or are they inherently incompatible with
23
each other? Those who advocated the latter position argued in
various contexts that society should weaken traditional free speech
protection in favor of egalitarian goals, such as women’s rights,
equality for racial and other minority groups, and equality of access
to the political process for non-wealthy individuals. Again, this
general debate underscores the inherent subjectivity of the term
“progressive.” If you believe that freedom of speech promotes
inequality, then censorship becomes a progressive goal. However,
if you share my belief that freedom of speech is the essential
bedrock for equality, then censorship is anti-progressive.
In previous publications, I have demonstrated that, overall,
freedom and equality are mutually reinforcing, rather than
24
antagonistic goals. Moreover, I have demonstrated that particular
free speech restrictions, which some advocate as allegedly
advancing equality, will in fact do the opposite. This is true, for
example, of restrictions on the MacDworkin concept of
“pornography”—sexually oriented expression that depicts
25
“subordinating” views of women; restrictions on “hate speech”
26
that reflect stereotypes or bias about minority groups; and
restrictions on the amount of money that groups or individuals may
27
spend to express views about electoral candidates or issues. The
23. See Carl Wilson, Northern Closure, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 1993, at 788
(discussing the negative impacts on sexual and socio-economic equality resulting
from increased censorship efforts concerning pornography by Canadian Customs
and Parliament).
24. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The
American Civil Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
143, 149–52 (1994) (discussing the integral interrelationship between freedom
and equality).
25. See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 59.
26. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, A Comment on Redish and Kaludis’s The Right of
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next section summarizes the major reasons underlying the
conclusion that censoring pornography inhibits not only women’s
rights, but also closely interconnected progressive concerns
including reproductive freedom, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender
(LGBT) rights, and human rights in general.
B. Censorship of Sexual Expression Undermines Women’s Equality
The list below sets out specific reasons, contrary to the claims
of the MacDworkinite feminists, which illustrate why suppressing
pornography actually undermines the critically important goals of
reducing discrimination and violence against women. I will
elaborate briefly on some of these reasons in the next subsection.
1.

List of Reasons for This Conclusion

• Censoring pornography would suppress many works that are
28
especially valuable to women and feminists.
• Enforcing any pornography censorship scheme would
discriminate against the least popular, least powerful groups
29
in our society, including feminists and lesbians.
• It would perpetuate demeaning stereotypes about women,
30
including that sex is bad for us.
• It would perpetuate the disempowering notion that women
31
are essentially victims.
• It would divert resources from constructive approaches to
32
countering discrimination and violence against women.
• It would harm women who voluntarily work in the sex
33
industry.
Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1135 (1999)
(arguing that campaign finance restrictions undermine access to the political
system, as well as freedom of speech).
28. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 199–215.
29. See id. at 167–70.
30. See id. at 107–18.
31. See id. at 247–56.
32. See id. at 266–79.
33. See id. at 179–98.
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• It would harm women’s efforts to develop their own
34
sexuality.
• It would strengthen the power of the right wing, whose
35
patriarchal agenda would curtail women’s rights.
• Finally, by undermining free speech, censorship would
deprive feminists of a powerful tool for advancing women’s
36
equality.
2. Censorship of Sexual Expression Has Particularly Harmed
Women and Advocates of Women’s Rights, Including Reproductive
Freedom
a. This Pattern Is Consistent with the Analysis of the Pro-Censorship
Feminists Themselves

Just as free speech has always been the strongest weapon to
advance equal rights causes, censorship has always been the
strongest weapon to thwart them. Ironically, the explanation for
this pattern lies in the very analysis of those feminists who want to
curb pornography. They contend that women are relatively
37
disempowered and marginalized. I agree with that analysis, and
possess a deep commitment to solving this problem. However, I
strongly disagree that censorship is a solution. To the contrary,
precisely because women are relatively powerless, it makes no sense
to hand the current power structure yet another tool that it can use
to further suppress them—in both senses of the word “suppress.”
Consistent with the analysis of the censorship advocates themselves,
the government will inevitably wield this tool, along with others, to
38
the particular disadvantage of already disempowered groups. The
enforcement record of all censorship measures, around the world,
and throughout history, confirms this conclusion.
The pattern of disproportionately targeting disempowered
groups under censorship measures extends even to measures that
34. See id. at 161–78.
35. See id. at 217–29.
36. See id. at 30–32.
37. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography,
and Equality, 1985 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 20–21 (1985).
38. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 236–39.
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their drafters claim they designed for those groups’ benefit.
Two examples clearly illustrate this: the enforcement record in the
one country that has embraced the MacDworkin concept of illegal
39
pornography, on the rationale that it would benefit women, and
the enforcement record of the many measures barring hate speech,
40
on the rationale that they would benefit minority groups.
Governments have consistently used all forms of censorship to
suppress speech by, about, and for women. Here, the particularly
pertinent ones are laws permitting the suppression of sexually
oriented expression, which lawmakers have often used to suppress
information essential for women’s rights, including reproductive
freedom. In the United States, the government has consistently
used anti-obscenity laws to suppress information about
contraception and abortion. For example, the government used
the first federal anti-obscenity statute in this country, the 1873
“Comstock Law,” to repeatedly prosecute pioneering feminists and
41
birth control advocates early in the twentieth century. Its targets
42
included Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parenthood.
Sanger also had the dubious distinction of being one of the
first victims of a new form of censorship, applied to the newly
established medium of cinema. The Supreme Court had ruled in
1915 that movies were not protected “speech” under the First
43
Amendment. One of the first films banned under that decision
was “Birth Control,” a 1917 picture produced by and featuring
44
Margaret Sanger. The banning of films concerning birth control
and other sexually oriented subjects of particular interest to
feminists continued in the United States into the second half of the
twentieth century. UCLA Law Professor Kenneth Karst stressed this
fact when he urged pro-censorship feminists to think twice about
arguing that pornography should not be constitutionally protected
45
speech. Until the 1950s, he noted, censors routinely banned films
that dealt with birth control, pregnancy, abortion, non-marital
39. See infra, Part II.B.2.c.
40. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 221–24, 229–32, 235–36.
41. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of
Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society--From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 748–49 (1992).
42. See id. at 766–67.
43. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), overruled
by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
44. See Message Photo-Play Co. v. Bell, 166 N.Y.S. 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917).
45. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 136–42 (1990).
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46

children, prostitution, and divorce.
b.

This Pattern Has Continued in Cyberspace

The most recent laws that target sexual expression—those
passed in the mid-1990s to regulate cyberspace—underscore the
consistent pattern throughout history that such laws, no matter
how well-intended, have a disproportionate adverse impact on the
progressive cause of women’s rights, as well as the interrelated
progressive causes of reproductive freedom and rights for sexualorientation minorities. In the ACLU’s many lawsuits that have
successfully challenged cybercensorship laws as violating the First
Amendment, the courts have concurred that prime targets of all
these laws include expression concerning women’s sexual and
reproductive health and options, as well as expression concerning
47
LGBT sexuality.
The ACLU’s clients in these cybercensorship
cases show that, sadly, this fact is true.
I find it particularly striking, for instance, that one of our
48
clients in the groundbreaking case of Reno v. ACLU —the Supreme
Court’s first ruling concerning the First Amendment in cyberspace,
issued in 1997—was Planned Parenthood Federation of America.
During the ACLU’s first decade of existence, one of our clients was
Planned Parenthood’s Founding Mother, Margaret Sanger. As I
noted above, the federal government repeatedly harassed and
prosecuted her under the Victorian-era Comstock Law, which
criminalized the information she conveyed about women’s
reproductive health options. Sadly, more than three quarters of a
century later, we had to defend the organization that Sanger
founded against the Internet era’s first federal cybercensorship law,
which criminalized the very same information. Just as the
government censored Sanger herself when she conveyed birth
control information via film, the organization she founded faced
censorship for conveying the same information through this
generation’s technological wonder, the Internet.
Consider a few of the other ACLU clients whose freedom of
49
expression cybercensorship laws jeopardize:
46. Id. at 129.
47. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997).
48. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
49. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Free Speech: Internet
Censorship Press Releases, http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/internet/index.html
(last visited October 18, 2006).
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• The American Association of University Women: Maryland,
which promotes equity, education, self-development over
the life span, and positive societal change for all women and
girls. It also works to remove barriers and develop
opportunities that enable women and girls to reach their
full potential;
• Books for Gay and Lesbian Teens/Youth Page, a website
operated by a high school student listing books that may be
of interest to gay and lesbian youth;
• Critical Path AIDS Project, an AIDS treatment and
prevention information project that offers AIDS treatment
and safer sex information specifically geared toward young
people;
• Full Circle Books, one of the oldest and largest feminist
bookstores in North America;
• Human Rights Watch, the largest U.S.-based international
human rights organization, which documents and
challenges human rights abuses around the world, many of
which involve sexual abuse against women;
• Obgyn.net, a comprehensive online resource center for
obstetricians, gynecologists, and the women they serve,
offering up-to-the-minute information, clinical reference
collections, and discussion forums;
• Philadelphia Gay News, an award-winning weekly publication;
• PlanetOut, a website serving as an online community for gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and as a
valuable resource for “closeted” people who do not
voluntarily disclose their sexual orientation due to fear of
others’ reactions;
• Queer Resources Directory, one of the largest online
distributors of gay, lesbian, and bisexual resources on the
Internet;
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• Riotgrrl, a magazine aimed at young feminists;
• The Safer Sex Page, which maintains a large archive of
information about minimizing the risks of sexually
transmitted diseases;
• Salòn Magazine, a leading general-interest online magazine,
whose feature articles address sexuality, among other topics,
and which also includes a regular column entitled “Sexpert
Opinion” by feminist author and sex therapist Susie Bright;
• Sexual Health Network, which provides information about
sexuality geared toward individuals with disabilities,
including articles on erectile dysfunction, the use of sex
toys, and sexual surrogacy as a form of sexual therapy;
• Stop Prisoner Rape, which is dedicated to combating sexual
abuse in our nation’s prisons, including abuse among the
fastest growing segment of our nation’s prison population—
50
women;
• Jeff Walsh, editor of Oasis Magazine, a monthly online
magazine for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and questioning youth
that includes news, reviews, and safer sex advice columns
written by and for gay and lesbian youth.
Again, the courts acknowledge that the online expression of
these individuals and organizations is subject to prosecution under
various laws targeting “cyberporn,” even though that expression has
serious value. That expression has particular value for the causes of
women’s rights, reproductive freedom, and LGBT rights. Thus, in
cyberspace, as in other media, defending freedom of sexual
expression continues to be especially important for advocates of
women’s rights, as well as advocates of equality rights more broadly.

50. See, e.g., Number of Women in Prisons is on Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at
A18; Maureen Buell, Women in Contact with the Criminal Justice System have Specific
Needs, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2005, at 28 (2005).
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c. This Pattern also Pertains to the Sole MacDworkin-Style Law
that Is Currently in Force
We now have actual experience with a feminist-style antipornography law in one country: Canada. In 1992, the Canadian
Supreme Court incorporated the MacDworkinite feminists’
definition of illegal pornography into Canada’s obscenity law. In
51
Butler v. The Queen, the court held that Canada’s obscenity law
would bar sexual materials considered “degrading” or
52
“dehumanizing” to women. In short, almost a decade after the
Minneapolis City Council adopted the Dworkin-MacKinnon model
law, Canadian law embraced the same concept. Therefore, the
experience in Canada illustrates what would have happened in
Minneapolis were it not for Mayor Fraser’s principled vetoes. The
results are far from “progressive.”
Alas for women, the Butler regime’s enforcement record
followed the familiar pattern that characterizes the enforcement of
all measures targeting sexual expression. It harmed the very
groups and causes it intended to help. Canada’s new censorship
regime specifically victimizes the writings and bookstores of
53
women, feminists, lesbians, and gay men.
The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), a
Canadian anti-pornography organization that MacKinnon cofounded, spearheaded the Butler ruling. Although LEAF, along
with Dworkin and MacKinnon, initially hailed Butler as a great
54
triumph for women’s rights, the organization soon repudiated
this alleged victory. In 1993 LEAF leaders and anti-censorship
activists in Canada issued a joint news release that condemned the
methods authorities were using to enforce Butler, saying that the
government employed these techniques “to harass and intimidate
lesbians and gays” as well as “bookstores, artists, AIDS

51. Butler v. The Queen, [1992] S.C.R. 452.
52. Id.
53. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 281 (citing Canada Customs Hits Feminist Stores
and Others, FEMINIST BOOKSTORE NEWS, MAR.–APR. 1993, at 21).
54. See Tim Kingston, Canada’s New Porn Wars: ‘Little Sister’ Gay/Lesbian
Bookstore Battles Canadian Customs, S. F. BAY TIMES, November 4, 1993, at 4 (quoting
Andrea Dworkin as saying that “[t]he Butler decision is probably the best
articulation of how pornography, and what kinds of pornography, hurt the civil
status and civil rights of women”); STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 230 (quoting Elaine
Carol, in Feminism and Censorship (transcript available from the Canadian
Broadcasting Company) (Toronto: CBC Radio Works, 1993)).
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55

organizations, sex trade workers, and safe sex educators.”
Within the first two-and-a-half years after the Butler decision,
Canadian Customs officials had confiscated or detained materials
from well over half of all Canadian feminist bookstores on the
ground that these materials satisfied the criteria in Butler of being
56
“degrading” or “dehumanizing” to women. Because the rationale
asserted in Butler is to protect women from works that harm them,
it is hard to understand how these seized feminist writings would
satisfy the Butler standards. Ironically, officials have also suppressed
some feminist material under Butler on the ground that it is
allegedly degrading and harmful not to women, but rather to
57
men. In the ultimate irony, Andrea Dworkin herself had written
two of the earliest books that Canadian Customs seized on the
58
According to
authority of Butler at the U.S.-Canada border!
Canadian Customs officials, Dworkin’s anti-pornography tracts
59
illegally “eroticized pain and bondage.”
C. Censorship of Sexual Expression also Undermines Equality for SexualOrientation Minorities

As former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan wrote,
“In a world where sodomy may still be made a crime, gay
pornography is the samizdat [clandestine copying and distribution
60
of government-suppressed literature] of the oppressed.” In light
55. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 241 (citing News Release, Women’s Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF), Historic Gathering Condemns Targeting of
Lesbian and Gay Materials and Sex Trade Workers, (June 21, 1993)) [hereinafter
Historic Gathering].
56. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 231 (citing Canada Customs Hits Feminist Stores
and Others, FEMINIST BOOKSTORE NEWS, MAR.–APR. 1993, at 22).
57. See, e.g., id. at 236 (citing Canada Customs Hits Feminist Stores and Others,
FEMINIST BOOKSTORE NEWS, MAR.–APR. 1993, at 21). Canadian Customs seized a
book entitled WEENIE TOONS: WOMEN ARTISTS MOCK COCKS, on the ground that it
was degrading to the penis. Id. See also Bill Redden, O for Christ’s Sake Canada,
PDXS (Portland), Aug. 30–Sept. 12, 1993, at 3 (discussing the banning of books
featuring the cartoon character Lesbian Hothead Paisan, a “lesbian hothead
terrorist,” who attacks certain men).
58. See Pierre Berton, How Otto Jelinek Guards Our Morals, TORONTO STAR, May
29, 1993, at H3. See also Albert Nerenberg, Fear Not, Brave Canadian, Customs Stands
on Guard for Thee, GAZETTE (Montréal), Jan. 22, 1993, at A2 (reporting that the two
books seized were ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
(1981), and ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974)).
59. Sarah Scott, Porn Police: Who Decides What to Ban at the Border?, GAZETTE
(Montréal), Apr. 14, 1993, at A1.
60. Kathleen Sullivan, The First Amendment Wars, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28,
1992, at 35, 39.
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of the longstanding and ongoing legal and societal discrimination
that lesbians and gay men face, materials depicting and exploring
their sexuality are especially important, serving to educate, liberate,
and empower. Yet precisely because of the second-class legal and
social status of LGBT individuals, expression about them is
especially vulnerable to censorship. The experience under recently
enacted cybercensorship laws corroborates that conclusion, as
discussed above, and that conclusion also applies under
MacDworkin-style laws, despite their allegedly egalitarian rationale.
No wonder one of the most outspoken critics of the
Minneapolis anti-pornography ordinance was Tim Campbell, the
61
editor of the local gay-lesbian community weekly GLC Voice. Back
in the early 1980s, when this ordinance was under consideration,
the legal rights and societal status of LGBT individuals were even
more tenuous than they are now, so this censorial measure would
have been an especially severe setback to the LGBT rights cause.
Decrying the ordinance’s sweeping breadth, Campbell warned:
I defy the [Minneapolis] city council members to . . . write
a three-sentence story involving a woman and sex that
would pass the test of this ordinance. . . . It is unAmerican, it is fascist, it is antisexual. . . . The only love
story you could write now is Jack met Jill . . . and neither
62
one pursued the other and they lived happily ever after.
One witness who testified against the Minneapolis ordinance
observed that the “movement against pornographic bookstores has
had a terrible effect on the gay community,” leading to police
63
brutality and the arrests of gay men. Another witness emphasized
the importance of adult bookstores as meeting places for gay men
64
and “as a place to be sexual together.”
61. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 646 (referencing a column in the
Twin Cities weekly, CITY PAGES, as stating that “among citizens’ groups . . . only the
[Minnesota Civil Liberties Union] and gay male press had come out strongly
against the ordinance”).
62. JAMES R. PETERSEN, CENTURY OF SEX: PLAYBOY’S HISTORY OF THE SEXUAL
REVOLUTION 407 (Hugh M. Hefner ed. 1999). Some members of the LGBT
community supported the ordinance, just as some members of the feminist
community did. Indeed, the deciding vote in favor of the 1984 version of the
ordinance was cast by Brian Coyle, the first openly gay member of the City
Council. (The author is grateful to Minneapolis attorney Randall Tigue for having
brought the preceding point to her attention.) Nonetheless, the law’s strongest
opponents were LGBT spokespeople, along with civil libertarians. See Brest &
Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 646.
63. See Brest & Vandenburg, supra note 3, at 629.
64. Id.
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If the MacDworkinite feminists had their way, sexually oriented
expression would be equally unattainable for women and men, for
gays and straights. Those concerned about LGBT rights should not
delude themselves that the feminist anti-pornography juggernaut
would not ride roughshod over their preferred sexual materials,
along with those of everyone else. Such an exemption is available
neither in theory nor in practice.
In theory, the feminist anti-pornography activists have made
clear that homosexual, as well as heterosexual, materials are equally
subject to censorship. The MacDworkin model law, which the
Minneapolis City Council passed, permits the suppression of any
sexually oriented expression regardless of the genders or the sexual
65
orientations of the individuals depicted. A leading gay activist and
writer, John Preston, drawing on his experience in Minneapolis
during the early 1970s when he was director of the Gay House, Inc.,
underscored this law’s intended antipathy toward gay sexual
expression:
Dworkin used to run a lesbian discussion group in the
center. One of her favorite antics . . . was to deface any
poster or other material that promoted male
homosexuality. “THIS OPPRESSES WOMEN!” she’d
write all over the place. . . . I’ve come to understand that
it’s the expression of any male sexuality that she feels fuels
the oppression of women in our society. That makes gay
66
men not allies, but a big part of the problem.
Responding to the gay male critics of the proposed
Minneapolis ordinance, MacKinnon maintained that “the gay male
community perceives a stake in male supremacy, that is in some
ways even greater than that of straight men. . . . Instead of making a
common cause to fight what is a common oppression, they take

65. To be sure, the ordinance began its definition of the targeted
“pornography” as “the sexually explicit subordination of women.” MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., PROPOSED ORDINANCE 84-Or-132, § 2 (1984) (vetoed by Mayor Donald M.
Fraser July 13, 1984) (amending section 139.20 of the MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF
ORDINANCES (relating to civil rights) to include a new subsection (gg); the
language is from subdivision (1) of the new subsection) [hereinafter 1984
ORDINANCE]. However, the ordinance also extended that term to “the use of men,
children, or transsexuals in the place of women.” Id. (subdivision (2) of the new
subsection (gg)). Moreover, its provision allowing civil actions against anyone
“trafficking in pornography” provided that “[a]ny man or transsexual who alleges
injury by pornography in the way women are injured by it shall also have a cause of
action.” Id. (amending section 139.40 by adding new subsection (m)).
66. John Preston, Whose Free Speech?, BOSTON PHOENIX, Oct. 8, 1993, at sec. 1.
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essentially a suicidal and self-destructive stance in favor of the
67
existing structure.” A supporter of the Minneapolis ordinance,
defending its application to gay bookstores, said: “Gay male
pornography . . . [is] no exception: that which is fucked . . . is that
68
which is female.”
Further demonstrating her equal-opportunity condemnation
of all sexual expression, Dworkin also denounced lesbian
69
pornography as an expression of self-hatred.
Other antipornography feminists have echoed this view. For example, Norma
Ramos, general counsel for Women Against Pornography, said in a
1994 Ms. magazine symposium: “[T]here’s no distinction between
what lesbian pornographers are doing and what these women who
are fronting for the [mainstream] pornography industry are doing.
. . . They may package it as art, or say that they are introducing a
70
new vision.
But it is sexual exploitation.”
Likewise, the
organization Dykes Against Porn, which has chapters in cities
around the country, has stated that “[i]t was formed because of the
need that many saw to fight pornography in the lesbian
71
community, as well as heterosexual male porn.”
Antipornography feminists have repeatedly attacked On Our Backs, a
72
lesbian erotic magazine published in San Francisco.
Another factor is even more significant than the pornophobic
feminists’ nondiscriminatory denunciations of homosexual and
heterosexual sexual expression. Government officials and legal
systems that reflect society’s pervasive homophobia and
heterosexism would enforce any censorship measures. Thus, it is
not surprising that under the first feminist anti-pornography
scheme to go into operation, in Canada, lesbian and gay erotica has
withstood the worst of the censorship.
As noted above, even LEAF, the MacDworkinite antipornography group that initially championed the Butler ruling,
shortly thereafter acknowledged that it had been used “to harass
73
and intimidate lesbians and gays.” As one LEAF lawyer observed,
67. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 641.
68. Id.
69. Kingston, supra note 54, at 6.
70. Symposium, Where Do We Stand On Pornography?, MS., Jan.–Feb. 1994, at
32, 39.
71. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 169 (citing Caitlin Sullivan, Bookstores
Vandalized over “Lesbian Porn” Issue, SEATTLE GAY NEWS, July 9, 1993).
72. See id.
73. See Historic Gathering, supra note 55.
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too many Canadian judges and other officials who enforce Butler,
reflecting the persistent homophobia on both sides of the border,
74
believe that all homoerotic expression is “degrading.”
Government officials have so systematically harassed Canada’s
lesbian and gay bookstores that, according to Bruce Walsh of the
Canadian anti-censorship coalition Censorstop, “every gay
bookstore in this country has attempted to sell their bookstores, but
75
nobody wants to buy them.”
One of Canada’s LGBT bookstores, Little Sisters Bookstore in
76
Vancouver, actually brought a lawsuit against the government,
arguing that the post-Butler censorship regime violated not only
freedom of speech, but also equality, under Canada’s Charter of
77
Rights and Freedoms.
Although the Canadian Supreme Court
unanimously recognized that Canadian officials were using their
purported authority under Butler to harass Little Sisters and other
78
LGBT bookstores, the majority refused to alter Butler. This was
particularly ironic, because LEAF—the prime proponents of
Butler—had filed a brief in the Little Sisters case, effectively
“confessing error” and acknowledging that the censorial regime
under Butler was, after all, not good for (at least) those women and
79
feminists who happen to be lesbian. The Canadian high court did
not accept LEAF’s invitation to carve out an exception to Butler
solely for sexually explicit expression involving lesbians—an
understandable stance, in light of the principled and pragmatic
80
difficulties that such an exception would entail.
Instead, the
74. See Karen Busby, LEAF and Pornography: Litigating on Equality and Sexual
Representations, 9 CANADIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 165, 185 (1994).
75. Redden, supra note 57, at 4.
76. See Margaret Wente, Counterpoint: Bad Porn, Good Porn, Little Sisters, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 16, 2000, at A15 (commenting that the case should be
called “Little Sisters v. Big Sister . . . because the anti-porn feminists are a big part
of Little Sisters’ problem”).
77. See Caroline Alphonso & Kirk Makin, Gay-Book Sellers Win Supreme Court
Case, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 16, 2000, at A1.
78. See Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] S.C.R. 1120.
79. See Kirk Makin, Judging the Charter: Part 2; “This case . . . is out of control,”
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 8, 2002, at A6 (noting that LEAF’s brief “deftly
argued that lesbians were a distinct minority whose self-identity was based partly in
possessing their own, unique brand of sexual material—material that may include
portrayals of violence or degradation”). Moreover, the article quoted a civil
liberties lawyer critical of the Butler and Little Sisters rulings as saying “that in
response to LEAF’s tacit admission that it ‘had led the court a bit astray’ in Butler,
the judges effectively thundered back: ‘What do you mean! You told us it was a
great idea!’” Id.
80. See Wente, supra note 76. The article noted that, according to LEAF’s
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Canadian Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed that “non-violent
degradation” of women is criminally punishable, no matter how
consensual, pleasurable, and otherwise positive such expression
might be for any of its female producers and/or consumers, of any
81
sexual orientation.
In addition to the direct government censorship of lesbian and
gay expression under Butler, the decision has also incited massive
self-censorship. In an effort to forestall costly customs seizures,
police raids, and court battles, bookstore owners avoid ordering
periodicals whose previous issues have been confiscated. As a
result, the lesbian erotic magazines Bad Attitude and On Our Backs
“have effectively been banned in Canada,” according to Janine
82
Fuller, manager of Little Sisters. Likewise, to avoid incurring the
wrath of Canadian Customs, Oxford University Press refused to
distribute in Canada the book Gay Ideas: Outing and Other
83
Controversies by philosopher Richard Mohr.
D. Restricting Sexual Expression Undermines Human Rights More
Broadly
1. Measures Targeting Sexual Expression Have Consistently Been
Used to Suppress Political Dissent
I will now discuss one final example of the adverse impacts on
progressive equality goals that result from censoring what pro-

argument, the very same image should be deemed either
[a] patriarchal example of pornographic misogyny that dehumanizes and
degrades women and will probably lead to our further victimization by
the men who view this filth . . . [o]r a healthy exploration of sex that is
vital to gay and lesbian identity, dignity, self-worth, community
formation, health and education,” depending on who “made, . . . sold,
. . . and bought [the image].”
Id.
81. Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] S.C.R. 1120, ¶ 60.
(“Portrayal of a dominatrix engaged in the non-violent degradation of an
ostensibly willing sex slave is no less dehumanizing if the victim happens to be of
the same sex, and no less . . . harmful in its reassurance to the viewer that the
victim finds such conduct both normal and pleasurable.”)
82. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 244 (quoting Human Rights Watch Free
Expression Project, A Ruling Inspired by U.S. Anti-Pornography Activists Is Used to
Restrict Lesbian and Gay Publications in Canada, Feb. 1994, at 9).
83. See id. at 240 (quoting Human Rights Watch Free Expression Project, A
Ruling Inspired by U.S. Anti-Pornography Activists Is Used to Restrict Lesbian and Gay
Publications in Canada, Feb. 1994, at 8–9).
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censorship feminists denounce as “pornography.” Because sexual
expression is an integral aspect of human freedom, governments
that repress human rights in general have always suppressed sexual
speech. Correspondingly, laws against sexual speech have always
targeted views that challenge the prevailing political, religious,
84
cultural, or social orthodoxy.
Sexually explicit speech has been banned by most repressive
regimes, including Communism in the former Soviet Union,
Eastern bloc countries, and China; apartheid in South Africa; and
fascist or clerical dictatorships in Chile, Iran, and Iraq. Conversely,
recent studies of Russia have correlated improvements in human
rights, including women’s rights, with the rise of free sexual
expression. Writer Pete Hamill explains the connection:
Recent history teaches us that most tyrannies have a
puritanical nature. The sexual restrictions of Stalin’s
Soviet Union, Hitler’s Germany and Mao’s China would
have gladdened the hearts of those Americans who fear
sexual images and literature. Their ironfisted Puritanism
wasn’t motivated by a need to erase inequality. They
wanted to smother the personal chaos that can
accompany sexual freedom and subordinate it to the
granite face of the state. Every tyrant knows that if he can
85
control human sexuality, he can control life.
In places where real pornography—sexually explicit
expression—is conspicuously absent, tellingly, political dissent is
labeled as such. The Communist government of the former Soviet
Union suppressed political dissidents under obscenity laws. In
1987, when the Chinese Communist government dramatically
increased its censorship of books and magazines with Western
political and literary messages, it condemned them as “obscene,”
“pornographic,” and “bawdy.” The white supremacist South
African government banned black writing as “pornographically
immoral.” In Nazi Germany and the former Soviet Union, Jewish
86
writings were reviled as “pornographic.”
Even societies that generally respect human rights, including
free speech, tend to use the terms “obscenity” and “pornography”
as epithets to stigmatize expression that is politically or socially
84. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 218–19.
85. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 219 (citing Pete Hamill, Woman on the Verge of a
Legal Breakdown, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1993, at 189).
86. See Alan Dershowitz, What is Porn?, 72 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (1986). See also
STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 219.
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unpopular. Courts have often enforced obscenity laws against
individuals who have expressed disfavored ideas about political or
religious subjects. In the eighteenth century, the Tory government
brought one of the earliest British obscenity prosecutions to
imprison its leading Whig opponent, John Wilkes. In early
American history, anti-obscenity laws targeted speech that was
87
offensive to the prevailing religious orthodoxy.
2. Obscenity Laws Have Been Used to Target Expression of Minority
Speakers and Dissident Ideas
The pattern holds today. Obscenity laws in the United States
regularly have been used to suppress expression by individuals who
are relatively unpopular or disempowered, whether because of
their ideas or because of their membership in particular societal
groups.
Recent major obscenity prosecutions have targeted
expressions by or about members of groups that are powerless and
unpopular, including rap music of young African-American men
and homoerotic photographs and other works by gay and lesbian
artists. Likewise, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) has
been subject to many political attacks for its funding of art
88
exploring feminist or homoerotic themes. A federal district court
judge recognized this point in the “NEA Four” case, in which the
ACLU represented four artists whose NEA grants were cut off
because of their works’ controversial political and sexual themes.
He wrote, “The NEA has been the target of congressional critics . . .
for funding works . . . that express women’s anger over male
dominance in the realm of sexuality or which endorse equal
89
legitimacy for homosexual and heterosexual practices.”
One fairly recent high-profile obscenity prosecution vividly
displayed the characteristic hallmarks of such prosecutions—
specifically, the targeting of expression with an unpopular political
message and the persecution of gays and lesbians. During the
87. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12–16 (3d ed.
2003).
88. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 20, 37, 55, 101–02, 104–05, 156
(summarizing recent right-wing attacks on the National Endowment for the Arts,
which criticized NEA grants as being “inconsistent with ‘traditional family
values’”). Senator Jesse Helms attacked the funding of Robert Mapplethorpe’s
photographs, saying “[t]here is a big difference between ‘The Merchant of Venice’
and a photograph of two males of different races on a marble table top.” Id. at 55.
89. Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (C.D. Cal.
1992), rev’d, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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summer of 1994, the City of Cincinnati brought obscenity charges
against a gay and lesbian bookstore, the Pink Pyramid, and its
90
owner, manager, and clerk. These individuals, who were arrested
and handcuffed, faced sentences of up to six months imprisonment
and fines of up to $1,000. Their “crime”? They had rented out a
video of the film Salò, 120 Days of Sodom, by Pier Paolo Pasolini, a
world-renowned Italian filmmaker, novelist, and poet. The film’s
sexual-political subject is the dark aspect of sexuality that had
served Italian fascism. According to film critic Peter Bondanella,
Salò “is a desperate . . . attack against . . . a society dominated by
91
manipulative and sadistic power.”
Just as the allegedly obscene video itself had a deeply political
message, so too did the charges against those who rented it out.
The city announced these prosecutions on the opening day of a
federal lawsuit that the ACLU and Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund brought, challenging a referendum that had
92
overturned gay and lesbian civil rights legislation. As the National
Coalition Against Censorship commented: “At best, the timing
suggests indifference to the possibility that these prosecutions
93
would exacerbate already existing prejudices and intolerance.” At
worst, given the frivolous nature of obscenity charges based on a
film of such indisputably serious value, the prosecution was a
calculated act of harassment. Accordingly, the ACLU filed a brief
on behalf of an impressive array of individuals and organizations
from the worlds of film, art, and academia, urging the court to

90. City of Cincinnati v. Pink Pyramid, 1995 WL 610709, *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 18, 1995).
91. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 105 (citing Letter from Jeremiah Gutman, Jo
List Levinson, & Leanne Katz to Terence Cosgrove, Cincinnati Prosecutor (July 27,
1994)).
92. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff
challenged the city charter amendment “bar[ring] [the] City Council and city
administration from enacting any legislation or policy on behalf of gays, lesbians
and bisexuals including anti-discrimination legislation.” Id. at 445. The lower
court ruled that the amendment was unconstitutional. Id. at 444. The Sixth
Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and, in turn, the Supreme Court vacated
that ruling. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). On remand, the Sixth
Circuit reaffirmed its previous ruling. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 105 (citing Letter from Jeremiah Gutman, Jo
List Levinson, & Leanne Katz to Terence Cosgrove, Cincinnati Prosecutor (July 27,
1994)).
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dismiss these charges before subjecting the defendants to a
94
The judge rejected this
pointless and chilling criminal trial.
95
argument.
3. The Minneapolis Anti-Pornography Ordinance also Would Have
Authorized the Targeting of Minority Speakers and Dissident Ideas
96

Cincinnati has been dubbed “Censor-nati” in light of its
cultural and political conservatism and its associated strict
enforcement of anti-obscenity laws. Moreover, Cincinnati targeted
Salò under a traditional anti-obscenity law, which is aimed at
upholding local community moral values. Accordingly, one might
contend that this outcome would not occur in such a relatively
progressive venue as Minneapolis, under the “civil rights approach”
of the MacDworkinite anti-pornography law, designed to promote
women’s rights.
As Dworkin herself explicitly confirmed,
unfortunately, any such purported distinction is illusory.
While the Minneapolis City Council was debating the
ordinance, the Twin Cities weekly City Pages interviewed Dworkin
and MacKinnon about the ordinance’s scope from their
perspective as its authors. Strikingly, more than a decade before
Cincinnati actually prosecuted a lesbian/gay bookstore for renting
Salò, Dworkin, on her own initiative, cited it as an example of a
work that, despite its artistic value, would still be subject to
suppression under the law that she and MacKinnon had coauthored. When the City Pages interviewer asked Dworkin and
MacKinnon whether another artistically acclaimed, sexually explicit
film (Susanna by Luis Bunuel) would be covered by their proposed
Minneapolis ordinance, Dworkin responded:
I haven’t seen that, but I do want to say that sometimes an
artist, who is recognized as such, makes a piece of

94. Brief for Film Society of Lincoln Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, City of Cincinnati v. Pink Pyramid, No.
94CRB021245 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct. Nov. 3, 1994).
95. City of Cincinnati v. Pink Pyramid, No. 94CRB021245 (Hamilton County
Mun. Ct. Nov. 3, 1994). However, the judge subsequently granted a motion to
dismiss the indictment on another ground: that the city had seized the videotape
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court of Appeals of Ohio
reversed that decision in State v. Pink Pyramid, No. C-940930, 1995 WL 610709
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1995), and the case eventually settled with The Pink
Pyramid paying a $500 fine. Dan Horn, Sex Case Settled; Bookstore Fined in Plea
Bargain, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at 14A.
96. See, e.g., WELCOME TO CENSORNATI (Independent film 1990).
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pornography. And if that film is a piece of pornography
according to this definition [in the ordinance], it would
be subject to suit, and I think that’s all right. And I give as
97
an example of that Pasolini’s Salò.
In that same interview, Dworkin elaborated on the reason
why—in contrast to the concept of obscenity that the Supreme
Court has carved out of the First Amendment—the MacDworkin
ordinance deliberately contains no exception for works with serious
artistic value (or other serious value): “The subordination of
women is a pretty universal fact, certainly in Western culture.
Artists contribute to that. Male artists are notorious not only for
their own personal domination of women but for the fact they glory
98
artistically in the domination of women.”
4. Freedom of Sexual Speech Is an Integral Aspect of Equality and
Human Rights
The historical and ongoing enforcement record of laws against
sexual speech make clear that what is at stake is more than freedom
of sexual expression, important as that is. Even beyond that, the
freedom to produce or consume anything called “pornography” is
an essential aspect of the freedom to defy prevailing political and
social mores. Just as gay pornography is the samizdat of individuals
who are oppressed or dissident sexually—to quote again the words
99
of former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan —
pornography in general is the samizdat of those who are oppressed
or dissident in any respect. UCLA Law Professor Kenneth Karst
provides intriguing insights into the link between sexual freedom,
including free sexual expression, and freedom from
discrimination:
The suppression of Unreason is rooted in the same fears
that produce group subordination: men’s fear of the
feminine, whites’ fear of blackness, heterosexuals’ anxiety
about sexual orientation. Historically, all these fears have
been closely connected with the fear of sexuality. It is no
accident that the 1960s, a period of sexual “revolution,”
also saw the acceleration of three movements that sought
major redefinitions of America’s social boundaries: the
civil rights movement, the gay liberation movement, and
97.
98.
99.

Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 636 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Sullivan, supra note 60.
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100

the women’s movement.
For the reasons Professor Karst articulates, free sexual
expression is intimately connected with equality—hardly at odds
with it, as argued by the anti-pornography feminists. Indeed, free
sexual expression is an integral aspect of all human freedom, even
beyond freedom from discrimination. This vital interconnection
was eloquently stated by Dr. Gary Mongiovi, who teaches at St.
John’s University in New York:
Sexual expression is perhaps the most fundamental
manifestation of human individuality. Erotic material is
subversive in the sense that it celebrates, and appeals to,
the most uniquely personal aspects of an individual’s
emotional life. Thus, to allow freedom of expression and
freedom of thought in this realm is to . . . promote
diversity and nonconformist behavior in general. . . . It is
no coincidence that one of the first consequences of
democratization and political liberalization in the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China was a small
explosion of erotic publications. . . . Suppression of
pornography is not just a free-speech issue: Attempts to
stifle sexual expression are part of a larger agenda
directed at the suppression of human freedom and
101
individuality more generally.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND INITIAL ENACTMENT OF THE
MACKINNON/DWORKIN MODEL “FEMINIST ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY
LAW” IN MINNEAPOLIS, 1983–1984
A. The Model Law’s Debut in—and Dissemination from—Minneapolis
1. The Beginnings of the Feminist Anti-Pornography, Pro-Censorship
Movement
In its initial phase in the late 1970s, the feminist critique of
sexist, violent imagery in sexual expression was simply a part of a
broader critique of sexist, violent imagery throughout our culture
and media. The goal was only to mobilize public opinion to
persuade the media to revamp their depictions; the feminist
100. See Karst, supra note 45, at 103–04.
101. Gary Mongiovi, Ph.D., Letters
Spring/Summer 1991, at 2.
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cultural and media critics expressly rejected any legal restrictions or
sanctions on expression. In 1979, Women Against Pornography
(WAP) was formed in New York. Although WAP advocated
education about and protest against sexist, violent pornography, it
expressly disavowed censorship, proclaiming: “We . . . are not
102
carving out any new exceptions to the First Amendment.”
By the early 1980s, though, a growing faction of feminists
began to focus on pornography to the exclusion of other forms of
expression that conveyed sexist or violent images, and also began to
call for legal restrictions on it. These developments were described
as follows by Columbia University professor Carole Vance, who
from the beginning has been a leader of the feminist anticensorship movement:
Initially, most feminists could certainly agree with the
contention that pornography was often sexist; but before
long it became clear that the claims and characterizations
of the anti-porn groups and leaders were becoming
grandiose and overstated. . . . Sexism in . . . sexually
explicit material was apparently worse than sexism
anywhere else. According to its critics, pornography was
now the central engine of women’s oppression, the major
socializer of men, the chief agent of violence against
103
women.
2. The History of the Efforts to Enact the MacDworkin Model AntiPornography Law in Minneapolis
As noted above, in 1983 Andrea Dworkin and Catharine
MacKinnon, at the behest of some members of the Minneapolis
City Council, drafted a model anti-pornography law and organized
104
and conducted hearings on the law that were expressly designed
to “show how pornography adversely affects women and is part of
105
women’s socially subordinate status.”
These hearings, which
102. See Nan D. Hunter, The Pornography Debate in Context: A Chronology of
Sexuality, Media, & Violence Issues in Feminism, in CAUGHT LOOKING 28 (Kate Ellis et
al. eds. 1988).
103. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 74 (quoting Carol Vance, in Feminism and
Censorship (transcript available from the Canadian Broadcasting Company
(Toronto: CBC Radio Works, 1993))).
104. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 621 (noting that “[i]n a quite
unusual procedure,” the City Council member who chaired the Government
Operations Committee before which the hearings took place, “asked MacKinnon
and Dworkin to conduct questioning”).
105. Id. at 617, 629 (quoting from the consulting contract pursuant to which
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106

garnered nationwide attention, consisted largely of anecdotal
testimony by women who maintained that pornography had
107
adversely affected them.
108
Promptly following these admittedly one-sided hearings, the
Council voted 7–6 in December 1983 to enact the ordinance,
without awaiting input from the various city agencies that had
requested a more deliberative consideration process: the City
Attorney’s office, the Civil Rights Commission, and the Library
109
Board.
Following Mayor Fraser’s veto on the ground that the
110
ordinance violated the First Amendment, and following the
January 1, 1984 change in the Council’s composition as a result of
the November 1983 elections, the reconstituted Council and other
city agencies pursued further deliberations. Although different
members occupied five of the thirteen Council positions, in July
1984, the Council again voted 7–6 in favor of a slightly revised
version of the MacDworkin model law. Mayor Fraser again vetoed
111
the law.
In light of my perspective that this law was neither progressive
112
nor pro-women’s rights, it is significant that Mayor Fraser was a
Minneapolis engaged Dworkin and MacKinnon).
106. See Minneapolis Asked to Attack Pornography, supra note 14.
107. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 624–28.
108. See id. at 628. In response to Council Member Kathy O’Brien’s
characterization of the hearings as one-sided, MacKinnon responded: “Saying that
a body of research is open to an interpretation to which it is not open is not
professional. . . . Andrea Dworkin and I did not waste the City Council’s resources
with outdated and irrelevant data and investigations. In this situation, the truth
apparently is a side.” Id.
109. Id. at 644–45.
110. See Minneapolis Mayor Vetoes Plan Defining Pornography as Sex Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1984, at A11 ([Fraser:] “The definition of pornography in the
ordinance is so broad and so vague as to make it impossible for a book seller,
movie theater operator or museum director to adjust his or her conduct in order
to keep from running afoul of its proscriptions.”).
111. See Demonstration Hits Decision on Obscenity Law, WASH. POST, July 14, 1984,
at A6.
112. Mayor Donald M. Fraser, born in Minneapolis, received his
undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Minnesota. He was
admitted to the bar in 1948 and actively practiced law until 1962. Mr. Fraser
served in the Minnesota Senate from 1954 until 1962, when he was elected to the
United States House of Representatives. He served there from 1963 to 1979. In
1979, he was elected Mayor of Minneapolis. Mr. Fraser was re-elected three times,
becoming the longest serving mayor in Minneapolis history. He left that office at
the end of 1993. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000350 (last visited
Nov. 19, 2006); Mayor’s Office, City of Minneapolis, Past and Present Mayors of
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progressive Democrat who had championed women’s rights
throughout his distinguished government career. Moreover, his
113
wife, Arvonne Fraser, a longtime, internationally recognized,
leader of the women’s right movement, opposed the ordinance as
114
Also noteworthy are the gender and
inimical to women’s rights.
115
116
party line-ups in the City Council votes. In both 1983 and 1984,
a majority of the Council’s male members supported the law, and
in 1983, a majority of the Council’s Republican members
117
supported it.
In contrast, in 1984, the majority of the female
118
Council members voted against the law, while in 1983, half of
119
In 1983, half the Democratic Council members
them did so.
Minneapolis, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/mayor/office/all-mayors.asp (last
visited Nov. 18, 2006).
113. Arvonne Fraser is a senior fellow emerita of the Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota, where she co-founded the
Institute’s Center on Women and Public Policy. Fraser also served as ambassador
to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, director of the International
Women’s Rights Action Watch, and coordinator of the Office of Women in
Development at the U.S. Agency for International Development. As director of
the International Women’s Rights Action Watch, she helped to publish “shadow
reports” on countries that had ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), in order to publicize the
CEDAW and to provide accurate information about the status of women. See
Elizabeth Noll, Arvonne Fraser: the Seeds of the International Women’s Movement, MINN.
WOMEN’S PRESS, Dec. 29, 2004, http://www.womenspress.com/main.asp?Search=1
&ArticleID=830&Section ID=3&SubSectionID=29&S=1 (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
114. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 639 (noting that “Arvonne
Fraser, a feminist scholar at the Hubert Humphrey Institute . . . described the
ordinance as a step backwards because it treats women as dependents, as a
victimized class that must be protected”).
115. The following four male members voted in favor of the 1983 law: Walter
Dzeidzic, Walter H. Rockenstein II, Tony Scallen, and Van White. The following
three male members voted against the 1983 law: Patrick Daugherty, Mark Kaplan,
and Dennis Schulstad. 1983 ORDINANCE, supra note 9 (Record of Council Vote).
116. The following four male members voted in favor of the 1984 law: Brian
Coyle, Walter Dzeidzic, Tony Scallen, and Van White. The following two male
members voted against the 1984 law: Steve Cramer and Dennis Schulstad. 1984
ORDINANCE, supra note 65 (Record of Council Vote).
117. The following three Republican members voted in favor of the 1983 law:
Sally Howard, Walter H. Rockenstein II, and Dennis Schulstad. The following two
Republican members voted against the 1983 law: Barbara Carlson and Dennis
Schulstad. 1983 ORDINANCE, supra note 9 (Record of Council Vote).
118. The following four female members voted against the 1984 law: Barbara
Carlson, Joan Niewmiec, Kathy O’Brien, and Alice Rainville. The following three
female members voted for the 1984 law: Sharon Sayles Belton, Sandra Hilary, and
Charlee Hoyt. 1984 ORDINANCE, supra note 65 (Record of Council Vote).
119. The following three female members voted against the 1983 law: Barbara
Carlson, Kathy O’Brien, and Alice Rainville. The following three female members
voted for the 1983 law: Charlee Hoyt, Sally Howard, and Jacquelin Slater. 1983
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120

voted against the law, and in 1984, almost half of the Democratic
121
members voted against the watered-down version of the law.
3. The Ongoing Censorial Impact of the Minneapolis Proceedings,
Both in Minnesota and Beyond
Although the MacDworkin model law never went into effect in
Minneapolis, it still had a major effect in stimulating the
consideration of similar laws in many jurisdictions around the
United States and beyond.
Likewise, feminist advocates of
suppressing pornography have frequently cited the testimony of
self-described “pornography victims” during the hearings on the
122
Moreover, according to those
proposed Minneapolis ordinance.
who were engaged in these debates, the high-profile, high-pressure
anti-pornography crusade led to much self-censorship in
Minneapolis, including on the part of members of the feminist and
123
LGBT communities.
Accordingly, while this episode did not
result in the draconian suppression in Minneapolis that would have
followed from the ordinance’s actual enactment there, it did
nonetheless lead to substantial suppression, both in Minnesota
itself and far beyond.

ORDINANCE, supra note 9 (Record of Council Vote).
120. The following four Democratic members voted against the 1983 law:
Patrick Daugherty, Mark Kaplan, Kathy O’Brien, and Alice Rainville. The
following four Democratic members voted for the 1983 law: Walter Dzeidzic, Tony
Scallen, Jacquelin Slater, and Van White. Id.
121. The following four Democratic members voted against the 1984 law: Steve
Cramer, Joan Niemiec, Kathy O’Brien, and Alice Rainville. The following six
Democratic members voted for the 1984 law: Brian Coyle, Sharon Sayles Belton,
Walter Dzeidzic, Sandra Hilary, Tony Scallen, and Van White. 1984 ORDINANCE,
supra note 65 (Record of Council Vote).
122. See, e.g., Diana E.H. Russell, Professor Emerita of Sociology, Against
Pornography: The Evidence of Harm, Address Before the 7th International
Congress on Women (June 25, 1999), available at http://www.skk.uit.no/WW99/
papers/Russell_Diana_E_H.pdf, at 16–20 (last visited Oct. 14, 2006); Gloria
Steinem, Book review of IN HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds. 1998), Harvard University Press
Publication Reviews, http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/MACHAR.html?show
=reviews (last visited Oct. 14, 2006) (“In the words of real experience and personal
testimony, In Harm's Way shows that pornography is to females what Nazi literature
is to Jews and Klan propaganda is to Blacks. Whether or not all such hate
literature is protected by the First Amendment, all must be rejected if we are to
live together with dignity and safety.”).
123. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 629 (quoting a witness stating
that the Minneapolis “movement against pornographic bookstores has had a
terrible effect on the gay community”).
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Indeed, one can fairly conclude that these widely publicized,
dramatic proceedings in Minneapolis have continued to play at
least some role in fueling all subsequent measures targeting sexual
expression, even those that different proponents advocate. For
example, the Meese Pornography Commission, with its traditional,
conservative membership and agenda, co-opted the MacDworkinite
rhetoric that had been developed in Minneapolis as a purported
justification for stepped-up enforcement of traditional anti124
obscenity laws.
Furthermore, in Minnesota itself, in 1994, the state supreme
court sua sponte cited concerns for protecting women against sexual
harassment as an ostensible justification for city laws barring nonobscene sexually explicit expression among consenting adults, even
when the municipal officials who defended the laws did not invoke
125
that asserted rationale.
There was no evidence that government
officials who enacted the law considered any such potential adverse
126
effect, let alone any evidence that there was any such actual
effect.
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court Justices
127
apparently were taking “judicial notice” of the purported causal
connection between lawful sexual expression and unlawful sexist
conduct, which the Minneapolis hearings had sought to
128
substantiate.
4. An Asserted “Civil Rights Approach” that Is Opposed by the
Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission
Defining pornography as a form of sex discrimination,” the
MacDworkin model law that the Minneapolis City Council adopted

124. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 82.
125. See Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1994)
(upholding two ordinances outlawing nude dancing in bars, even while
recognizing that nude dancing is expression protected under federal and state
constitutional free speech guarantees, and even though there was no record of any
associated negative effect, by speculating that “the City Council may have felt” that
this “adult entertainment could . . . be construed as a subliminal endorsement for
unlawful sexual harassment”).
126. Indeed, in 1963, when the ordinance was adopted, the concept of sexual
harassment had not even been articulated by feminists such as Catharine
MacKinnon, who later, commendably, spearheaded efforts to acknowledge it as a
form of unlawful gender discrimination. For a more extended discussion of this
issue, see infra text accompanying notes 190–195.
127. FED. R. EVID. 201; MINN. R. EVID. 201.
128. Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 173 (Gardebring, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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was hailed by its proponents as embodying a civil rights approach
129
However, the City Council did not consult the
to the issue.
Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission before adopting the law, and
some members of the Commission expressed “fear that under the
130
measure they would be forced into the role of censors.”
At the
hearings on the proposed law, the Chairman, as well as other
members of the Civil Rights Commission, raised “some very serious
questions” and reservations they had about the ordinance,
including the fact that its gender-specific definition of pornography
131
was itself discriminatory. Moreover, after efforts began in 1984 to
reintroduce this purported civil rights law in a revised form, the
Commission did undertake its own study. As a result, it officially
opposed the law not only because the “commissioners would be
required to act as censors,” but also because it would divert the
Commission’s resources “to the detriment of existing protected
132
classes” under longstanding anti-discrimination laws.
5.

Summary of the Law’s Speech-Repressive Provisions

133

The law authorized civil lawsuits for damages and injunctive
relief for four offenses: “trafficking in pornography,” “coercion into
pornography,” “forcing pornography on a person,” and “assault or
physical attack due to pornography.” All four offenses are linked
by the common, and hopelessly vague, definition of pornography
as “graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through
pictures and/or words.” The definition also lists eight additional
criteria purporting to give further specificity to the central notion
of “subordination,” but these just compound its inherent,
intractably vague, and subjective nature:
• women are presented as dehumanized sexual objects, things
or commodities; or

129. Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 619.
130. See Minneapolis Asked to Attack Pornography, supra note 14.
131. Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 634. The authors also noted that,
while “the ordinance acknowledged the possibility that men . . . also could be
injured by pornography, [it] emphasized that all women are.” Id. at 620. See also
1984 ORDINANCE supra note 65, § 2 (law’s provisions extend its reach to “men,
children, or transsexuals,” despite its focus on women).
132. Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 3, at 653.
133. The ordinance that the Minneapolis City Council passed in 1983 is
annexed as an Appendix to this article.
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• women are presented
humiliation or pain; or

as

sexual

objects

who

85

enjoy

• women are presented as sexual objects experiencing sexual
pleasure in rape, incest, or other sexual assault; or
• women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
• women are presented in postures or positions of sexual
submission, servility, or display; or
• women’s body parts—including but not limited to vaginas,
breasts and buttocks—are exhibited such that women are
reduced to those parts; or
• women are presented being penetrated by objects or
animals; or
• women are presented in scenarios of degradation,
humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context that makes these
134
conditions sexual.
Beyond the model law’s pervasive chill—if not deep freeze—of
free speech that results from its ambiguous “definition” of
pornography, each of the specific offenses that it creates also raise
philosophical, practical, and constitutional problems of their own.
135
The prohibition on “coercion into pornography” reflects an allencompassing concept of coercion, effectively decreeing that no
woman may ever volunteer or consent to perform in sexually
136
explicit productions, and thus treating women like children. The
134. 1983 ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 3. See also An Excerpt from Model
Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance, MS. (Jan./Feb. 1994), available at
http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/OrdinanceModelExcerpt.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (for additional language from the model ordinance not
included in the Minneapolis proposed ordinances). Some versions of the
MacDworkin law include a ninth criterion, that “women are presented as whores
by nature.” See 1983 ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 3(gg)(1)(vii).
135. Id. § 4(m).
136. The draft Minneapolis Ordinance by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin stated: “Children are incapable of consenting to engage in pornographic
conduct, even absent physical coercion, and therefore require special protection.
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prohibition on “forcing pornography on a person” reflects a
137
In addition, this section of
similarly sweeping concept of force.
the model law purports to limit sexual expression not only in
settings such as “a home” or “a place of employment [or]
education,” where important privacy and equality rights may limit
138
free speech rights, but also “in any public place,” where free
139
The cause of
expression must receive its maximum protection.
140
action for “assault or physical attack due to pornography”
effectively makes anyone who participates in producing or
distributing a sexually explicit work responsible for any assault that
might be committed by any individual who happened to see that
work. It thus deters the production or distribution of any sexually
oriented materials, while displacing legal and moral responsibility
141
from the actual assailant.
The section of the law that proscribes “trafficking in
pornography” is the most frontal attack on constitutional freedoms,
because it essentially makes it illegal “to produce, sell, exhibit, or
distribute” the targeted sexual speech, decreeing that it constitutes
142
“discrimination against women.”
This “trafficking” proscription
is essentially old-fashioned, moralistic prior restraint dressed in the
modern, progressive garb of a private anti-discrimination action, an
“empress’s new clothes.” It can be enforced not only by “any
143
woman . . . acting against the subordination of women,” but also
by “[a]ny man or transsexual who alleges injury by pornography in
144
the way women are injured by it.”
In short, despite the law’s
verbose rhetoric, its actual operational effect can be simply
summarized: it empowers anyone to halt any production or
145
distribution of sexual materials. Even libraries, including college
and university libraries, may be sued under this breathtakingly
By the same token, the physical and psychological well-being of women ought to
be afforded comparable protection.” Wendy McElroy, The Unholy Alliance, LIBERTY,
Feb. 1993, at 56. See also STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 179–98.
137. 1984 ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4(n) (1983).
138. Id.
139. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 69–72.
140. 1983 ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 4(o).
141. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 268–73.
142. 1984 ORDINANCE, supra note 65, § 3(m).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See David Shaffer, Landmark Porn Bill Approved, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 31,
1983, at A3 (“MacKinnon . . . said even the sale of Playboy magazine could be
affected by the ordinance because of the way the magazine portrays women.”).
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broad provision.

87

146

B. The Model Law’s Anti-Progressive Nature Is Underscored in
Indianapolis
The repressive reality underlying the feminist facade of the
MacDworkin law that the Minneapolis City Council had initially
adopted in 1983 became even more dramatically apparent in 1984
(in an appropriately Orwellian twist) when that same law was
enacted in Indianapolis with the solid support of conservative
Republican politicians and right-wing groups that had consistently
opposed women’s rights. One leading supporter, Baptist minister
Greg Dixon, had been an official in the Rev. Jerry Falwell’s Moral
147
Majority organization.
Every Democratic member of the
Indianapolis City Council voted against the law, while every
148
Republican member voted for it.
This ostensibly feminist law received no support from local
feminist groups; to the contrary, the local chapter of the National
Organization for Women (NOW) opposed it. In contrast, the law
was endorsed by the prominent anti-feminist Phyllis Schlafly, best
known for her campaigns against reproductive freedom and against
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S.
149
Constitution, which would prohibit gender-based discrimination.
One of Catharine MacKinnon’s allies in securing the law’s passage
was a conservative Republican woman who had been a leader of the
Stop ERA movement, former Indianapolis City Council member
150
Beulah Coughenour.
Testifying in support of her anti-pornography law before the
Indianapolis City Council, MacKinnon described Indianapolis as “a
place that takes seriously the rights of women and the rights of all
151
people.” This description came as a shock to the Indiana women
who had lobbied unsuccessfully for the ERA, as well as to the gay
men whom the Indianapolis police had beaten only weeks before
MacKinnon’s testimony, in an ugly episode that happened to be
146. 1984 ORDINANCE, supra note 65, § 3(m)(1).
147. See Lisa Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, in CAUGHT LOOKING 67
(Kate Ellis et al. eds. 1988).
148. Id.
149. Kathleen Currie & Art Levine, Whip Me, Beat Me, and While You’re at It,
Cancel My N.O.W. Membership: Feminists War Against Each Other Over Pornography,
WASH. MONTHLY, June 1987, at 17.
150. Id.
151. See Duggan, supra note 147, at 65.
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caught on videotape.
Sheila Suess Kennedy, a Republican feminist attorney also
excoriated MacKinnon’s misappropriation of the feminist mantle.
Notably, MacKinnon’s anti-pornography ally Coughenor had
attacked Kennedy in a 1980 political campaign specifically because
of Kennedy’s pro-ERA and other feminist positions. Kennedy
stated in her written testimony to the Indianapolis City Council: “As
a woman who has been publicly supportive of equal rights for
women, I frankly find it offensive when an attempt to regulate
expression is cloaked in the rhetoric of feminism. Many supporters
of this proposal have been conspicuously indifferent to previous
152
attempts to gain equal rights for women.” Likewise, Kathy Sarris,
president of an Indiana lesbian and gay rights organization, asked:
“It has not occurred to Mayor Hudnut to put women in leadership
positions in city-county government; why is he now so concerned
153
with the subordination of women in pornography?”
The foregoing key aspects of the Indianapolis situation—
MacKinnon’s unholy alliance with opponents of women’s rights,
and her disregard for both the local political reality and the views
of local feminist leaders—presaged an ongoing pattern in the
feminist anti-pornography movement. This pattern includes that
movement’s support of the 1986 Meese Pornography Commission,
which right-wing opponents of women’s rights dominated, and its
support for the 1992 Canadian Supreme Court decision upholding
the MacDworkin concept of illegal “pornography” under Canadian
law, which has wreaked havoc on feminist bookstores and lesbian
literature. Indeed, tellingly, the local leaders of the 1983–84
Minneapolis anti-pornography campaign expressly hailed the
154
Meese Pornography Commission report,
thus expressly
distancing themselves from the many strong critics of that report,
155
including most feminists, LGBT activists, and other progressives.
In all of these contexts, the proponents of the feminist procensorship laws that were launched in Minneapolis in 1983 have
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Bruce Benidt, Leaders of City Pornography Fight Encouraged, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 15, 1986, at B1.
155. See, e.g., id. (quoting Tim Campbell, publisher of the GLC Voice, a gay
newspaper in Minneapolis, and also William Lockhart, former University of
Minnesota Law School Dean, who chaired an earlier national commission on the
same subject, which advocated decriminalizing all sexual expression for
consenting adults).
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repeatedly overlooked the actual concerns of the real women
whom these laws most directly affect. These tendencies are at best
politically naive and at worst cynically opportunistic.
C. The Courts’ Verdict on the Law: Unconstitutional and Unwise in
Terms of Women’s Rights
Approximately one hour after Mayor William Hudnut (a
conservative Republican) signed the Indianapolis version of the
Dworkin-MacKinnon law, a coalition of booksellers, publishers, and
others involved in creating, distributing, and reading or viewing the
massive materials that the law endangered challenged it in federal
court. This coalition argued, and in the case American Booksellers
156
Association v. Hudnut, the courts agreed, that the MacDworkinite
anti-pornography law violated the First Amendment’s free speech
guarantee. The federal trial court judge in Hudnut struck down the
law; the U.S. Supreme Court in turn affirmed. Indeed, the law so
plainly violated fundamental free speech principles that the
Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding through a
procedure called “summary affirmance,” under which the Court
did not even receive briefs, hear oral arguments, or issue an
opinion.
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling stressed that, by singling out only
depictions or descriptions that subordinate women, the
MacDworkinite anti-pornography law violates the cardinal free
speech principle of “content neutrality” or “viewpoint neutrality,”
which means that government may never censor speech just
because any listener—or, indeed, the majority of the community—
157
disapproves of its message.
In an opinion by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who had been a prominent University of Chicago Law
School professor before his judicial appointment, the court
explained:
The ordinance discriminates on the ground of the
content of the speech. Speech treating women in the
approved way—in sexual encounters “premised on
equality”—is lawful no matter how sexually explicit.
Speech treating women in the disapproved way—as
submissive in matters sexual or as enjoying humiliation—
is unlawful no matter how significant the literary, artistic,
156. Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984),
aff’d, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
157. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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or political qualities of the work taken as a whole. The
state may not ordain preferred viewpoints in this way. The
Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective
158
right and silence opponents.
Both the American Civil Liberties Union and the Feminist
Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT) filed briefs in the Hudnut case
arguing that the MacDworkinite anti-pornography law violated
women’s constitutional equality rights, as well as free speech
159
rights. Because the trial and appellate courts invalidated the law
on First Amendment grounds, they did not need to resolve the
equality issue. Nevertheless, the opinion of the trial judge—who
happened to be a woman, Sara Evans Barker—did note one of the
reasons why this law actually undermines women’s equality, far
from promoting it. Judge Barker observed:
It ought to be remembered by . . . all . . . who would
support such a legislative initiative that, in terms of
altering sociological patterns, much as alteration may be
necessary and desirable, free speech, rather than being
the enemy, is a long-tested and worthy ally. To deny free
speech in order to engineer social change in the name of
accomplishing a greater good for one sector of our society
erodes the freedoms of all and . . . threatens tyranny and
160
injustice for those subjected to the rule of such laws.
Although MacKinnon has decried the Hudnut decision as “the
161
Dred Scott of the women’s movement,” referring to the Supreme
162
Court’s justly maligned 1856 decision upholding slavery, Hudnut
163
is in fact more like the Brown v. Board of Education of the women’s
rights movement. Just as Brown recognized that racially separate
schools are inherently unequal, Hudnut recognized that any
separate concept of free speech for expression by or about women
or sexuality is also inherently unequal.
The Supreme Court’s 1986 summary affirmance in the Hudnut
case seemed to seal the constitutional doom of any attempt to
embody the feminist anti-pornography, pro-censorship analysis in
law. Following Hudnut, a federal court struck down another
158. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325 (citations omitted).
159. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 80.
160. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1337.
161. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 213 (1987).
162. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
163. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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version of the MacDworkin model law, enacted by voter
referendum in Bellingham, Washington in 1988, and promptly
164
challenged by the ACLU.
Likewise, in 1989, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Andrea Dworkin’s argument
(in her lawsuit against Hustler magazine, regarding unflattering
statements it had published about her) that it should hold that the
MacDworkinite concept of pornography was outside the
Constitution’s free speech protection; the court dismissed this
argument as “contrary to fundamental First Amendment
165
principles.”
D. The More Recent Feminist/Progressive Consensus: Counter to the
MacDworkinite Law
Since the Minneapolis City Council’s adoption of the
MacDworkinite anti-pornography law a generation ago, the procensorship feminist faction has faded from public prominence,
almost to the vanishing point. A confluence of law and culture has
repudiated this censorial approach and recognized its regressive
effects, no matter how progressive some proponents intended it to
be. This pro-sexual-speech stance is especially prominent among
younger women and feminists, indicating that it is likely the wave of
166
the future.
Journalists have chronicled the rise of a new breed of

164. Vill. Books v. City of Bellingham, No. C88-1470D (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9,
1989).
165. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 1989).
Interestingly, a female judge, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, wrote the opinion. Id. at
1190.
166. See, e.g., Jodi Rudoren, The Student Body, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, at A4.
The article further notes how college “[s]tudent editors, administrators and
experts on adolescent sexuality” see the recent appearance of campus sex
magazines and sex columnists in campus newspapers as reflecting the fact that
“many feminists are adopting a ‘sex-positive’ approach that views pornography as
expression, not exploitation.” Id. The article quotes Pamela Paul, author of a
2005 book critical of pornography, as saying, “[c]ollege women have really bought
into both the pornography industry’s way of spinning porn—this is hip, sexy,
harmless entertainment and women should really get in on it—and the new
academic perspective on pornography—as long as we own our sexuality and it’s
our choice, then, great, more power to us.” Id. See also Wente, supra note 76 (“A
great many [feminists] (especially younger ones) are pro-sex and anti-censorship.
They think the logic of [the MacDworkinite anti-pornography measures] is not
progressive and liberal, but repressive and reactionary. . . . [O]ne young feminist
[stated]: “The real problem is the patriarchal repression of our freedom to express
our sexuality.”)
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feminists, increasingly prominent both in women’s studies
programs and in academia more generally—former strongholds of
167
the feminist pro-censorship camp —as well as on the wider
cultural scene, who hardly eschew sexual expression. To the
contrary, these female, feminist scholars, artists, and activists not
only defend sexual expression against repression, but they
168
proactively celebrate and even create it.
One manifestation of this new feminist movement for freedom
of sexual expression, underscoring the regressive nature of the
position that the Minneapolis City Council adopted in 1983–84, is
the nationwide success of Eve Ensler’s award-winning play, The
169
Vagina Monologues.
Its graphic treatment of not only female
sexual organs, but also female sexual pleasure, extends beyond
simulation to stimulation. In short, it satisfies the dictionary
denotation of “pornography” as sexually arousing expression. As
one (male) reviewer observed:
All around the country, men are dialing those 900
numbers and paying several bucks a minute for this kind
of performance. And the show has the feel of male
pornography, from the stupid puns on the posters
(“Think Outside the Box”), to the structure (a series of
unrelated sexual encounters), to the worldview (women
want to have sex all the time), to the underlying message
of each episode (great sex is possible between people who
have absolutely no emotional commitment to each
170
other).
The Vagina Monologues has been attacked by a conservative
taxpayers’ group that objected to its performances at state colleges
171
That it would be criticized by cultural and
and universities.
religious conservatives is not surprising. After all, it celebrates not
only women’s sexuality, but also women’s freedom to explore and
enjoy that sexuality outside the “traditional nuclear family.” What
167. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at xxxi–xxxvii, 26–29, 88–90 (discussing
campus incidents involving the suppression of expression viewed as inconsistent
with the views of pro-censorship feminists).
168. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at xxix n.53.
169. Id. On a personal note, I want to mention that, at the invitation of Eve
Ensler, I had the honor of guest-starring in this powerful play for one week at the
National Theatre in Washington, D.C. in October, 2001. See Nelson Pressley,
“Vagina Monologues” at the National: The Privates Go Public, WASH. POST, Oct.19, 2001,
at C5.
170. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at xxix n.55.
171. Id. n.56.
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is surprising, though, is that this work has escaped the wrath of antiporn feminists. To the contrary, it has been produced and
attended all over the country, including on hundreds of campuses,
with the strong support of the feminist community.
I doubt this could have happened in the heyday of
MacDworkinism; pro-censorship feminists likely would have tried to
block the production or would have attended it only to picket and
protest.
Recall that the Dworkin-MacKinnon model antipornography law, as adopted by the Minneapolis City Council,
condemns any sexually explicit material in which “women’s body
parts—including . . . vaginas . . . — are exhibited such that women
172
are reduced to those parts.”
A recurrent theme in The Vagina
Monologues is precisely that women do or should see themselves as
their sexual body parts. The author and the female actors clearly
intend this process of sexual self-discovery to serve an expansive
function, opening women up to new pleasures, possibilities, and
powers. Yet, viewed through the anti-porn prism, some could
attack the work as reductionist.
The play’s theme, which condemns sexual force and violence,
does not save it from pro-censorship feminists. On the contrary,
the Dworkin-MacKinnon model law, as adopted in Minneapolis,
expressly proscribes descriptions or depictions in which “women
are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement,
torture, shown as . . . bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
173
makes these conditions sexual.”
One of the most powerful, vivid
monologues in The Vagina Monologues was a Bosnian Muslim woman
graphically recounting—and vividly reliving—the savage gang rapes
and other forms of sexual torture and disfigurement she endured
during the Balkan conflict. Yet, in a 1993 Ms. Magazine cover story,
Catharine MacKinnon denounced descriptions or depictions of the
174
mass rapes in the Balkans as themselves pornographic.
In sum, looked at through the vantage point of contemporary
feminism, as well as the enduring constitutional principles that the
courts enforced in striking down Indianapolis’s version of the
MacDworkin-style law that the Minneapolis City Council adopted,
that law’s counter-progressive nature looms large and clear. After
all, how many feminists or other progressives today will argue that
172. 1983 ORDINANCE, supra note 9, § 3.
173. Id.
174. STROSSEN, supra note 6, at xxx n.59 (citing to Catharine MacKinnon,
Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, MS., July/Aug. 1993, at 24–30).
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175

censoring The Vagina Monologues, or bankrupting Eve Ensler —
results that are clearly warranted under that law—is a “progressive”
outcome?
IV. SUBSEQUENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MINNESOTA ALSO
RESTRICT FREEDOM OF SEXUAL EXPRESSION
After Minnesota played its historic role in the MacDworkinite
efforts to expand the government’s censorial power over sexual
expression, Minnesota has not again hosted further such efforts. In
other words, since then, Minnesota officials have not taken steps to
decrease legal protection for sexual expression below the federal
constitutional floor set by the U.S. Supreme Court. From my
progressive, feminist, civil libertarian perspective, that is the good
news. On the other hand, the bad news is that recent efforts in
Minnesota to reduce government censorial power over sexual
expression also have failed. In other words, Minnesota officials
have not taken steps to increase legal protection for sexual
expression above the federal constitutional threshold set by the
U.S. Supreme Court. In that noteworthy respect, Minnesota is less
progressive than a number of other states, which have afforded
greater protection to sexual expression under their state laws
and/or state constitutions.
A. Minnesota Officials Have Broadly Construed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Precedents that Permit Restrictions on Sexual Expression
Local governments throughout Minnesota have aggressively
passed laws imposing various kinds of restrictions on sexual
176
expression, arguing for broad interpretations of U.S. Supreme
175. See, e.g., Charles Isherwood, Theater; A Play of Ideas Can Make a Difference,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, at 26 (noting “the annual ‘V-Day’ benefits [The Vagina
Monologues] . . . have raised more than $40 million for local charities”); Anatomy of
a Drama Past Its Sell-By Date, IRISH INDEPENDENT (Dublin), Mar. 4, 2006 (“Thanks to
the campaigning efforts of Eve Ensler, its writer, the Monologues have raised more
than $25 million for charities that combat violence against women.”).
176. See, e.g., Janna Goerdt, Cities Make Zoning Laws Their Weapon of Choice to
Restrict Businesses, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Minn.), May 29, 2005, at 8A; Robert
Ingrassia, Council Approves Sex-Shop Moratorium, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.),
May 20, 2004, at 2B; Richard Meryhew, Neighbors Applaud Closing of Strip Club, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 17, 2002, at 1B; Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Library Porn
Goes Beyond Free Speech, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), May 8, 2000, at 1B (noting
lawyer representing librarians working at Minneapolis Public Library filed
complaint with U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, contending
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177

Court decisions that sanctioned certain restrictions.
Those
Supreme Court decisions were often narrowly decided, with
178
persuasive dissenting opinions.
Further, they have been widely
criticized by constitutional scholars and civil libertarians as unduly
179
Nonetheless,
expanding the government’s censorial power.
180
181
many Minnesota officials,
including many judges,
have
that “the library’s policy of allowing patrons free and completely open access to
the Internet creates a hostile work environment for library’s workers”); Noam
Levey, Sex Shop Zoning Drafted, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Minn.), May 3, 1998, at 1A;
David Hawley, Ramsey’s Anti-Porn Law Challenged in Federal Court, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS (Minn.), May 9, 1990, at 4D; Bob von Sternberg, Attorney General Circulates
Manual on How to Fight Porn, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 7, 1989, at 8D; Kevin
Diaz, Zoning Ordinance for Sex-Oriented Films Struck Down, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
May 23, 1989, at 1A; Aron Kahn & James Lileks, Banned in Minnesota?, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), May 29, 1988, at 1E; Don Ahern, Council Toughens Porn
Law; St. Paul Ordinance Scatters Businesses, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), May 20,
1988, at 1A.
177. See generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES, § 11.3.4 (2006).
178. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 587–96 (1991) (5–4
decision, with no majority opinion) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenters concluding
that First Amendment prohibits outlawing nude dancing); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (7–2 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(dissenters rejecting majority’s deferential review of zoning regulations targeting
sexually oriented businesses); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113
(1973) (5–4 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenters maintaining that there
should be no obscenity exception to First Amendment’s free speech guarantee).
179. For example, even the Meese Pornography Commission, which advocated
increased enforcement of anti-obscenity laws, was forced to recognize that “the
bulk of scholarly commentary” has criticized the Supreme Court’s decisions in this
area as inconsistent with the First Amendment. 1986 ATT’Y GEN. COMM’N ON
PORNOGRAPHY FINAL REPORT pt. 2, at 251 (1986).
180. There are notable exceptions, including: the six members of the thirteenmember Minneapolis City Council who voted against the MacDworkinite antipornography ordinance in 1983; the six Minneapolis City Council members who
voted against it in 1984 (including three of the newest members who took office in
January 1984); and Minneapolis Mayor Donald Fraser, who twice vetoed it. See
1984 ORDINANCE, supra note 65 (Record of Council Vote); 1983 ORDINANCE, supra
note 9 (Record of Council Vote). For another example of a Minnesota official
who likewise adhered to principle to defend freedom for sexual expression,
despite its political unpopularity, see Brian Bonner, Anti-Obscenity Ordinance Vetoed
by Scheibel, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Feb. 1, 1991, at 1B (quoting St. Paul
Mayor Jim Scheibel explaining his veto of an ordinance that “sought to keep
sexually ‘harmful’ materials away from minors in stores,” because of “serious . . .
issues involving free speech . . . , the limits and burdens placed on booksellers, and
the chilling effect of legislative restrictions that are uncertain until a jury makes a
determination”).
181. See, e.g., City of Elko v. Abed, 677 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Duncan, 605 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); City of Crystal v. Fantasy
House, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); City of Ramsey v. Holmberg,
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expansively interpreted those decisions as warranting measures to
suppress sexual expression that at least push, if not exceed, the
boundaries of the U.S. Supreme Court’s authorization.
For example, several opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court (two
of which were plurality opinions), over strong dissents, have upheld
zoning regulations that target businesses engaging in
constitutionally protected (i.e., non-obscene) sexually oriented
expression—such as adult bookstores, video stores, or bars
featuring nude dancing—on the rationale that these laws were not
really directly aimed at the expressive content. Rather, these
opinions maintained that the suppressive laws were aimed at the
“secondary effects” of the targeted sexual expression, such as
182
decreased property values or increased crime.
Dissenting
Supreme Court Justices, as well as other critics, have assailed this
“secondary effects” rationale as a legal fiction, which endangers
183
freedom of expression generally, even beyond sexual expression.
Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court extended the
rationale underlying these much-criticized U.S. Supreme Court
opinions even further, permitting even more regulation of sexual
expression, with even less evidence of any motivation other than
dislike of the expression by government officials and community
members, thus violating the core “content neutrality” concept
548 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Holmberg, 545 N.W.2d 65 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996); Jacobson v. County of Goodhue, 539 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995). But see Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 311 Minn. 186, 248 N.W.2d 708
(1976) (invalidating city’s nudity ordinance, which applied to all public dancing
places and places where tobacco was sold, as facially overbroad); City of Rochester
v. Carlson, 294 Minn. 417, 202 N.W.2d 632 (1972) (holding that where the trial
court correctly found as matter of law that magazines were not obscene, it was
error to submit the issue of pandering to the jury); State v. Botsford, 630 N.W.2d
11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (striking down as overbroad ordinance outlawing, but
failing to define, “other sexual conduct,” and holding that for night club dancer
to be convicted under “indecent conduct” ordinance, government would have to
prove that ordinance satisfied U.S. Supreme Court’s standards for obscenity).
182. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 295–96 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582–87 (1991) (plurality opinion).
183. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court relies on
the so-called ‘secondary effects’ test to defend the ordinance. The present use of
that rationale, however, finds no support whatsoever in our precedents. Never
before have we approved the use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on
protected First Amendment expression. On the contrary, we have been quite
clear that the doctrine would not support that end.”); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594
(White, J., dissenting) (“If the state is genuinely concerned with prostitution and
associated evils, . . . it can adopt restrictions that do not interfere with the
expressiveness of nonobscene nude dancing performances.”).
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underlying constitutional protection for free speech. In the 1994
case, Knudtson v. City of Coates, the Minnesota high court upheld
two city ordinances that outlawed nude barroom dancing although
there was no evidence whatsoever that the local officials had even
purported to base the laws on any alleged secondary effects, much
184
less any evidence that there actually were any such effects. To the
contrary, city officials admittedly enacted the laws because of
community complaints about the dancing itself, and not because of
185
any alleged secondary effects.
In short, the Minnesota Supreme Court went significantly
further than the U.S. Supreme Court had done in denying
constitutional protection for this kind of sexually suggestive
expression. Several members of the U.S. Supreme Court, in several
contested opinions (including opinions that did not garner
majority votes), had deferred to local officials’ assertions of
concerns about alleged secondary effects, without probing whether
those concerns actually motivated the speech-restrictive laws, or
whether such concerns were substantiated by evidence of adverse
secondary effects. In contrast, a majority of the Minnesota
Supreme Court itself concocted a speculative secondary effects
rationale for the laws it upheld in Knudtson, contrary to the record
evidence that the local officials did not even invoke such a
rationale. This approach went beyond the undue deference shown
by several U.S. Supreme Court Justices—always short of a
186
majority—to what has been called “pretextual jurisprudence.”
To illustrate the extent to which the Knudtson majority was
willing to engage in speculation and fabrication in order to allow
suppression of the nude dancing at issue, consider the following,
patently speculative language from its opinion:
[T]he City Council may have felt the particular
combination of liquor, nudity, and sex, while it might be
184. Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. 1994) (“[N]o
evidence was presented . . . showing any increase in crime . . . as a result of the
nude dancing . . . , nor was any evidence presented that dancers mingle with
patrons or that any ‘sexual improprieties’ had occurred.”).
185. Id. at 173–74 (Gardebring, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“An
examination of the text of the ordinances and the history of their adoption reveals
that their enunciated purpose was to suppress expressive conduct.”).
186. See e.g. Michael Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism,
Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as it Did,” 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999); Michael Perlin, “There’s No Success Like
Failure/And Failure’s No Success At All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v.
Hendricks,” 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998).
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viewed as adult entertainment, could also be construed as
a subliminal endorsement for unlawful sexual
187
harassment.
This cited justification for upholding the challenged law
suffers from at least three fatal flaws: one factual, one legal, and
one a matter of mixed law and fact. As a factual matter, this
purported description of the dancing is inaccurate insofar as it
suggests that it involved any element of “sex” other than the nudity
itself. As a legal matter, any alleged “subliminal endorsement” of
illegal conduct conveyed by any expressive activity—as the
Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously recognized the challenged
188
dancing to be —cannot be outlawed or punished consistent with
the First Amendment. To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly ruled that even explicit advocacy of illegal conduct
is protected expression under the First Amendment; any
expression that allegedly induces unlawful conduct can be
punished only if it rises to the level of intentional incitement of
189
imminent lawless conduct that is in fact likely to occur.
Finally, the court’s twofold surmise that “the City Council may
have felt” that the erotic dancing “could . . . be construed as a
190
subliminal endorsement for unlawful sexual harassment”
is
flawed because sexual harassment was not unlawful when the City
Council adopted the challenged ordinances, in 1978. At that time,
Minnesota law did not recognize anything “unlawful” about “sexual
harassment”—a concept that had not yet been fully articulated
even by feminist legal theorists, much less adopted by policy
makers. Catharine MacKinnon’s 1979 book Sexual Harassment of
191
Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination is widely credited with
having pioneered the notion that sexual harassment constitutes a
form of gender-based employment discrimination. The U.S.
192
Supreme Court did not adopt this notion until 1986.
In
Minnesota, the state supreme court did not recognize sexual
193
harassment as a tort until 1980, and the state legislature did not

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 169.
Id.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 169 (emphasis added).
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979)
192. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
193. See Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
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194

add it to the Minnesota Human Rights Act until 1982.
As
summarized by Minneapolis attorney Randy Tigue, who brought
this noteworthy point to my attention: “Thus, not only is there no
record [in the Knudtson case] that the City Council affirmatively
considered ‘unlawful sexual harassment’; such a consideration was
a practical impossibility [when the ordinance was adopted], given
195
the state of the law.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Knudtson
was forced to recognize, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court
rulings, that nude barroom dancing is constitutionally protected
expression under both the First Amendment to the U.S.
196
Constitution and the free speech guarantee in the Minnesota
197
Therefore,
by
hypothesizing
possible
Constitution.
“justifications” for barring such expression, absent any supporting
198
evidence, the majority endangered freedom of expression in
199
As Justice Gardebring noted in her dissent, the
general.
majority’s rationale “could be read to allow the most blatant forms
200
of political censorship.”
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Has Declined to Enforce the State
Constitution’s Broadly Phrased Free Speech Guarantee as Extending to
Sexual Expression
The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted various
provisions in the Minnesota Constitution as affording more
protection for individual rights than the U.S. Supreme Court has
held to be protected by counterpart provisions in the U.S.

194. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2004).
195. Email from Randall D.B. Tigue (August 30, 2006) (on file with William
Mitchell Law Review).
196. See Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1994).
197. See id. at 168. Significantly, the Knudtson court held “that the state’s
power to regulate the sale of liquor under the Twenty-First Amendment does not
limit the free speech protections of our state constitution.” Id. Accordingly, the
government has no additional power to regulate sexual (or other) expression in
bars or other venues where liquor is sold beyond its power to regulate expression
generally.
198. Id. (surmising that the city government “evidently found” or “may have
felt” that certain negative effects would result from the nude dancing).
199. See id. at 172 (Gardebring, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(“[U]se of these ‘interests’ [that the majority posited in support of the
ordinances] to support a restriction on protected speech, even speech only
marginally protected, will wreak havoc with our free speech jurisprudence.”).
200. Id.
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201

Constitution.
Like other state court judges, Minnesota judges
have based such progressive, rights-protective holdings on
distinctive language in the state constitution and/or on distinctive
202
state history.
As noted above, Minnesota’s constitutional free speech
guarantee, in contrast with its counterpart in the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, explicitly protects free expression “on all
203
subjects.” This distinctive constitutional language would certainly
support a strong argument that the Minnesota Constitution
protects freedom for sexual expression to the same extent as
expression about any other subject.
The language of Minnesota’s free speech provision is
distinguishable from that of the U.S. Constitution’s Free Speech
Clause in one other respect, which also weighs in favor of its
application to sexual expression: it protects “[t]he liberty of . . . all
persons” to “freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on all
204
subjects.”
The term “sentiments” generally refers to feelings, as
205
well as ideas. This is significant because one argument, offered in
support of inferring a First Amendment exception for sexually
oriented expression, is that such expression appeals to feelings or
206
emotions, rather than ideas or thoughts.
As I have explained
201. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (religious
liberty); State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (double jeopardy);
Wegan v. Vill. of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 281 n.14 (Minn. 1981) (equal
protection); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (rights of
criminally accused).
202. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 211,
217–18 (2006) (explaining that many state constitutions reflect the unique
character of the particular state); Jonathan Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of
State Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 500 n.266
(1998) (discussing proposed New York test allowing incorporation of “distinctive
attitudes of the State citizenry” in determining whether or not to interpret the
state constitution differently from the federal constitution).
203. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: “The liberty of the press shall forever
remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such rights.” In
contrast, the pertinent portion of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides: “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
204. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added).
205. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1134 (11th ed. 2003)
(defining “sentiment” as “an attitude, thought, or judgment prompted by
feeling”); Definition for “sentiment,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
sentiment (defining “sentiment” as “a thought, view, or attitude, especially one
based mainly on emotion instead of reason”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
206. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321
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elsewhere, this argument is not a persuasive ground for the
obscenity exception to the First Amendment’s Free Speech
207
Clause.
A fortiori, this argument is not a persuasive ground for
such an exception to Minnesota’s counterpart, since the latter
expressly extends to “sentiments.”
Yet another distinctive provision in the Minnesota Constitution
reinforces the conclusion that Minnesota’s free speech guarantee
should apply foursquare to sexual expression.
The state
constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of religion and
conscience expressly qualifies that guarantee by stating that it “shall
208
not be construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness.”
In sharp
contrast, the Minnesota Constitution’s free speech guarantee
contains no such exception, thereby indicating the framers’ intent
that it shall be construed to encompass expression and expressive
209
conduct that are “licentious” or sexually oriented.
In its important 1993 ruling in Knudtson v. City of Coates, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals suggested that the Minnesota
Constitution’s free speech guarantee extends more protection to
sexually oriented expression than the U.S. Supreme Court extends
210
Accordingly,
to such expression under the federal Constitution.
and also because it strictly construed U.S. Supreme Court decisions
211
permitting some restrictions on sexually oriented expression, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated restrictions on nude
dancing at licensed liquor establishments.
Moreover, in State v. Davidson, a significant 1991 ruling, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down the state anti-obscenity
212
statute.
Because the court held that this statute violated
Minnesota’s constitutional due process guarantee, it did not reach
the issue of whether the statute also violated Minnesota’s
(1992).
207. See STROSSEN, supra note 6, at 50.
208. MINN. CONST. art I, § 16.
209. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 717 (11th ed. 2003)
(defining “licentious” as “1. lacking legal or moral restraints; especially:
disregarding sexual restraints”).
210. Knudtson v. City of Coates, 506 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(rejecting holdings of other state courts that “have concluded that the scope of
free expression guarantees in state constitutions is no broader than First
Amendment protections”), rev’d, Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166
(Minn. 1994).
211. Id. at 33.
212. State v. Davidson, 471 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d, 481
N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1992).
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213

constitutional free speech guarantee.
Specifically, the court
concluded that the statute’s definition of obscenity does not afford
adequate notice of what expression it outlaws because it turns on
“community standards,” an inherently vague and subjective
214
concept.
In contrast with the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ progressive
rulings that enforced the state constitutional free speech and due
process guarantees to protect sexual expression for consenting
adults, the Minnesota Supreme Court has failed to issue similar
rulings. To the contrary, the state supreme court reversed both
Minnesota Court of Appeals rulings on point, and in the process
adopted a constricted view of the state constitution’s free speech
guarantee, which endangers other (non-sexual) expression, as well
215
as state constitutional rights more generally.
The most recent
such ruling, in the 1994 Knudtson case, was a closely divided 4–3
216
vote, provoking “an unusually inflammatory dissent.”
One problematic aspect of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
Knudtson ruling is that it permitted the suppression of the sexual
expression at issue, nude barroom dancing, even absent any
217
evidence of any associated criminal or other harmful activity.
Instead, the majority simply speculated that the government
officials “may have” concluded that this admittedly expressive
conduct was objectionable for other reasons, such as being
“offensive to community standards” or “convey[ing] a message to
213. Id. at 696.
214. Id. at 696–700.
215. See Mark D. Salsbury, Questions of Vagueness and State Constitutional
Legitimacy: The State Constitutional Challenge to Minnesota’s Obscenity Statute: State v.
Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn.1992), 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 317–18 (1992)
(criticizing the Minnesota Supreme Court for failing to “reject the increasingly
unpopular approach to obscenity regulation” and “failing to justify its decision,”
thereby undermining “the legitimacy” and “vitality of Minnesota constitutional
analysis”).
216. Dennis Cassano, Court Allows Cities to Ban Nude Dancing in Bars, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), July 2, 1994, at A1. See also Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 172
(Gardebring, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The majority . . . has
abandoned a worthy history of providing significant protection for individual
rights under the state’s constitution and approved an unprecedented and
frightening approach to free speech analysis.”). Justice Gardebring’s dissent
expresses fear that the majority’s approach will “make the Minnesota Constitution
largely irrelevant to the ongoing debate on the parameters of free speech in this
country.” Id.
217. Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 169 (“The sparse record does not show that
nude dancing . . . has resulted in any incitement to criminal activity, so in that
sense the public safety is not implicated.”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/14

52

Strossen: "Is Minnesota Progressive?"? A Focus on Sexually Oriented Express
2. STROSSEN - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC

11/20/2006 3:17:30 PM

2006] MINNESOTA AND SEXUALLY ORIENTED EXPRESSION

103

the children and teenagers of the community that this activity was
218
As explained above, this
socially and morally acceptable.”
rationale apparently goes beyond the “secondary effects” theory
that U.S. Supreme Court pluralities have asserted to justify bans on
nude barroom dancing under the U.S. Constitution.
In addition to narrowly construing the federal free speech
guarantee, the Knudtson ruling also construed the state free speech
guarantee at least as narrowly, if not more narrowly. As Justice
Sandra Gardebring noted in her forceful dissent, the majority
apparently held, for the first time, “that our state constitution’s free
speech protections are narrower than [those] provided by the First
219
Amendment of the federal constitution.”
As she also explained,
casualties include not only nude dancing and other sexually
oriented expression, but also many kinds of unpopular but
constitutionally protected expression, from flag burning to hate
220
speech.
C. In This Area, Minnesota Is Less Progressive than Other States, Which
Afford More Protection to Sexual Expression
Minnesota falls behind other states where either the lawmakers
or the courts have chosen to respect the rights of adults to make
their own choices in the realm of sexual expression, free from
government censorship. In short, in these other states, in contrast
to Minnesota, adults enjoy the same rights concerning sexual
expression as they do concerning other (i.e., non-sexual)
expression. For example, a number of state legislatures simply
have not passed laws that single out certain sexual expression for
221
Likewise, some state supreme
criminalization as “obscene.”
218. Id.
219. Id. at 171 (Gardebring, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
220. Id. at 172–73 (noting that “the free speech protections in our state and
federal constitutions are never more important than when unpopular speech is at
issue”).
221. The following six states do not have statutes outlawing the distribution or
display of obscene materials to adults: Alaska, Maine, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Vermont, and West Virginia. The remaining states do criminalize obscenity. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3502
(2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-68-201 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-102 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a194 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1361 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2201
(LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1280 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1211 (LexisNexis 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-4103 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-20 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §
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courts have interpreted their state constitutional guarantees of free
speech, privacy, and/or due process as barring any such
222
criminalization.
As yet another example, some state supreme
courts have interpreted their state constitutional free speech
guarantees as extending protection to nude dancing in bars or
223
other venues open only to consenting adults.
The approach of Oregon’s Supreme Court provides an
especially pertinent contrast to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
approach. Almost two decades ago, the Oregon Supreme Court
unanimously held, in State v. Henry, that there is no obscenity

35-49-3-1 (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.4 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214301 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.020 (LexisNexis 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:106 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-202 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
752.365 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. § 617.241 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-101
(2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 573.020 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-201
(2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-813 (LexisNexis 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
201.249 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650:2 (LexisNexis 1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-2 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.07 (McKinney 2000); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01 (1997); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1040.8 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2006-2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.087 (West 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5903 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-1 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15305 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.22
(Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.130 (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.68.140 (West 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.21 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4302 (2005).
222. See State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 379 (Haw. 1988) (holding that statute
prohibiting promotion of pornographic adult magazines infringed on customers’
right to privacy under State Constitution); State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987)
(holding that the state constitution’s free speech guarantee extends to sexual
expression that would be considered “obscene,” and hence unprotected under
U.S. Constitution, according to U.S. Supreme Court precedent); Id. at 10 (noting
that Oregon Court of Appeals had struck down state obscenity statute as
unconstitutionally vague, hence violating state due process guarantee, and stating
that “we do not disagree,” although also holding that statute violates Oregon’s free
speech provision). See also People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1070 (Colo. 1989)
(Erickson, J., concurring in the result only) (concluding that there is no obscenity
exception to state constitutional free speech guarantee); State v. Marshall, 859
S.W.2d 289, 295 (Tenn. 1993) (Reid, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that there is no obscenity exception to state constitutional free
speech guarantee).
223. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sees, 373 N.E.2d 1151 (Mass. 1978); Bellanca
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 429 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1006 (N.Y. 1982); State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613 (Or. 2005); City of Nyssa
v. Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639 (Or. 2005); Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591 (Pa.
2002).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/14

54

Strossen: "Is Minnesota Progressive?"? A Focus on Sexually Oriented Express
2. STROSSEN - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC

11/20/2006 3:17:30 PM

2006] MINNESOTA AND SEXUALLY ORIENTED EXPRESSION

105
224

exception to the Oregon constitution’s free speech guarantee.
That decision is especially relevant to Minnesota state
constitutional law because it was based on Oregon’s state
constitutional language and history, which are analogous to
Minnesota’s constitutional language and history.
First, the Oregon Supreme Court stressed that Oregon’s free
speech provision expressly applies to expression “on any subject
225
whatever,” virtually the same phrase that appears in Minnesota’s
226
constitution.
Second, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on the
territorial obscenity law that existed at the time its state constitution
was adopted, “which contained no definition of ‘obscene’ and
which was directed primarily to the protection of youth,” and
therefore “certainly does not constitute any well-established
historical exception to freedom of expression” for consenting
227
adults.
Again, the Minnesota situation is parallel; Minnesota’s
territorial anti-obscenity law, in force at the time the Minnesota
state constitution was adopted, “was virtually identical to Oregon’s
228
territorial law.”
For these reasons, the following declaration by
the Oregon court in Henry could have been fully applicable to
Minnesota constitutional law too:
We hold that characterizing expression as “obscenity”
under any definition . . . does not deprive it of protection
under the Oregon Constitution. Obscene . . . forms of
communication are “speech” nonetheless. . . .
“[O]bscene” expression cannot be restricted [because] it
is speech that does not fall within any historical exception
to the plain wording of the Oregon Constitution that “no
law shall be passed restraining . . . expression . . . freely on
229
any subject whatsoever.”
By failing to enforce the Minnesota Constitution’s broad free
speech guarantee as written, and by allowing censorship of sexually
224.
225.
226.

732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987).
Id. at 10.
The Minnesota Constitution protects expression “on all subjects.” MINN.
CONST. art I, § 3.
227. Henry, 732 P.2d at 16.
228. See State v. Davidson, 471 N.W.2d 691, 695 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(quoting appellant’s brief), rev’d, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1992).
229. Henry, 732 P.2d at 17 (criticizing U.S. Supreme Court’s exception to First
Amendment for obscenity, defined according to contemporary community
standards, because “the very purpose of the First Amendment is to protect
expression which fails to conform to community standards”) (quoting State v.
Tidyman, 568 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1977), rev. denied, 280 Or. 683 (1977)).
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oriented expression because it is deemed contrary to the majority
of the community’s mores, too many Minnesota judges and
lawmakers earn criticism similar to that voiced by former
Tennessee Supreme Court Chief Justice Lyle Reid. In dissenting
from a similar ruling by the majority of that state high court, thenChief Justice Reid stated:
And, so, the right most essential to personal dignity and
democratic government, the freedom of expression, is
handed into the willing grasp of the censor. That arbiter
of truth can by mere declaration, upon the claim of
morality and taste, abolish what has been conceived to be
230
a constitutional right.
V. CONCLUSION
Suppressing sexual expression counters multiple progressive
goals, including individual liberty—the right of mature, mentally
competent individuals to make their own choices concerning what
expressive material they create or view—as well as reproductive
autonomy and equality before the law, regardless of such factors as
gender or sexual orientation.
In the past quarter century, too many Minnesota laws, court
rulings, and official enforcement actions have strongly suppressed
sexual expression. Minnesota judges and other officials have
broadly construed U.S. Supreme Court decisions that permit
regulation of sexual expression under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Moreover, in actions that garnered nationwide
attention, the Minneapolis City Council twice passed antipornography ordinances, based on a model law drafted by antipornography, pro-censorship feminists Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine MacKinnon. Thanks to the principled vetoes of Mayor
Donald Fraser, those Minneapolis ordinances never went into
effect. But when the same kind of measure was enacted in
Indianapolis, all the courts that ruled on it, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, held that it violated fundamental free speech
principles.
The admittedly one-sided hearings before the
Minneapolis City Council that Catharine MacKinnon organized, at
the Council’s behest, to muster support for the law, have fueled
similar speech-restrictive measures elsewhere.
230. State v. Marshall, 859 S.W.2d 289, 295 (Tenn. 1993) (Reid, C.J., joined by
Daughtrey, J., concurring and dissenting).
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In contrast to Minnesota’s censorious record concerning
sexual expression, lawmakers in half a dozen other states have
chosen to fully respect the right of adults to view whatever sexual
expression they choose, without government interference.
Moreover, courts in several other states have construed their state
constitutions as granting significantly more protection for sexual
expression than the U.S. Supreme Court has found under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Minnesota’s state constitutional free speech guarantee is
written in notably broader language than the First Amendment.
Moreover, Minnesota’s distinctive history suggests that the framers
of the state free speech guarantee did not intend government to
have the power to suppress sexual expression. Nonetheless, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has read into that broad language an
unstated exception for sexual expression.
For all of the foregoing reasons, when it comes to sexual
expression, Minnesota law is hardly progressive. To the contrary, it
is regressive and repressive, consistent with Garrison Keillor’s quip
quoted at the outset of this article.
If Minnesota is to live up to its progressive reputation in this
crucial area, more officials and judges must follow in the footsteps
of the brave Minnesotans who have stood up against censorship of
sexual expression, many of whom are noted and quoted in this
article. Accordingly, this article generally is dedicated to all of the
Minnesota officials and citizens who have defended free speech in
the past, as well as to all who will do so in the future. In particular,
though, it is dedicated to two longtime progressive leaders who
have been extremely influential in their home state of Minnesota,
and whose positive, progressive impact—including on free speech
and women’s rights—has extended nationwide and beyond: Don
and Arvonne Fraser.
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APPENDIX
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., PROPOSED ORDINANCE 83-Or-323 (1983)
(vetoed by Mayor Fraser Jan. 1, 1984)
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS
Amending Title 7, Chapter 139 of the Minneapolis Code
of Ordinances relating to Civil Rights: In General.
The City Council of the City of Minneapolis do ordain as
follows:
Section 1. That Section 139.10 of the above-entitled
ordinance be amended to read as follows:
139.10 Findings, declaration of policy and purpose.
(a) Findings. The council finds that discrimination in
employment, labor union membership, housing
accommodations, property rights, education, public
accommodations and public services based on race, color,
creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, including
sexual harassment AND PORNOGRAPHY, affectional
preference, disability, age, marital status, or status with
regard to public assistance or in housing accommodations
based on familial status adversely affects the health,
welfare, peace and safety of the community. Such
discriminatory practices degrade individuals, foster
intolerance and hate, and create and intensify
unemployment, sub-standard housing, under-education,
ill health, lawlessness and poverty, thereby injuring the
public welfare.
(1) SPECIAL FINDINGS ON PORNOGRAPHY: THE
COUNCIL FINDS THAT PORNOGRAPHY IS
CENTRAL IN CREATING AND MAINTAINING THE
CIVIL
INEQUALITY
OF
THE
SEXES.
PORNOGRAPHY IS A SYSTEMATIC PRACTICE OF
EXPLOITATION AND SUBORDINATION BASED
ON SEX WHICH DIFFERENTIALLY HARMS
WOMEN. THE BIGOTRY AND CONTEMPT IT
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PROMOTES, WITH THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION
IT FOSTERS, HARM WOMEN’S OPPORTUNITIES
FOR EQUALITY OF RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT,
EDUCATION, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS AND PUBLIC SERVICES;
CREATE PUBLIC HARASSMENT AND PRIVATE
DENIGRATION;
PROMOTE
INJURY
AND
DEGRADATION SUCH AS RAPE, BATTERY AND
PROSTITUTION
AND
INHIBIT
JUST
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AGAINST THESE ACTS;
CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO RESTRICTING
WOMEN FROM FULL EXERCISE OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
PARTICIPATION
IN
PUBLIC
LIFE,
INCLUDING IN NEIGHBORHOODS; DAMAGE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SEXES; AND
UNDERMINE WOMEN’S EQUAL EXERCISE OF
RIGHTS TO SPEECH AND ACTION GUARANTEED
TO ALL CITIZENS UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS
AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
STATE OF MINNESOTA.
(b) Declaration of policy and purpose. It is the public
policy of the City of Minneapolis and the purpose of this
title:
(1) To recognize and declare that the opportunity to
obtain employment, labor union membership,
housing accommodations, property rights, education,
public accommodations and public services without
discrimination based on race, color, creed, religion,
ancestry, national origin, sex, including sexual
harassment AND PORNOGRAPHY, affectional
preference, disability, age, marital status, or status
with regard to public assistance or to obtain housing
accommodations without discrimination based on
familial status is a civil right;
(2) To prevent and prohibit all discriminatory
practices based on race, color, creed, religion,
ancestry, national origin, sex, including sexual
harassment AND PORNOGRAPHY, affectional
preference, disability, age, marital status, or status
with regard to public assistance with respect to
employment, labor union membership, housing
accommodations, property rights, education, public
accommodations or public services;
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(3) To prevent and prohibit all discriminatory
practices based on familial status with respect to
housing accommodations;
(4) TO PREVENT AND PROHIBIT ALL
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES OF SEXUAL
SUBORDINATION OR INEQUALITY THROUGH
PORNOGRAPHY;
(5) To protect all persons from unfounded charges
of discriminatory practices;
(6) To eliminate existing and the development of any
ghettos in the community; and
(7) To effectuate the foregoing policy by means of
public information and education, mediation and
conciliation, and enforcement.
Section 3. That Section 139.20 of the above-entitled
ordinance be amended by adding thereto a new
subsection (gg) to read as follows:
(gg) Pornography. Pornography is a form of
discrimination on the basis of sex.
(1)
Pornography
is
the
sexually
explicit
subordination of women, graphically depicted,
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes
one or more of the following:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual
objects, things or commodities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who
enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who
experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied
up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or
physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual
submission; or
(vi) women’s body parts – including but not
limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks – are
exhibited, such that women are reduced to those
parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature;
or
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(viii) women are presented being penetrated by
objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of
degradation, injury, abasement, torture, shown
as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in
a context that makes these conditions sexual.
(2) The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the
place of women in (1) (i–ix) above is pornography
for purposes of subsections (l) – (p) of this statute.
Section 4. That section 139.40 of the above-mentioned
ordinance be amended by adding thereto new subsections
(l), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q), (r) and (s) to read as follows:
(l) Discrimination by trafficking in pornography. The
production, sale, exhibition, or distribution of
pornography is discrimination against women by means of
trafficking in pornography:
(1) City, state, and federally funded public libraries
or private and public university and college libraries
in which pornography is available for study, including
on open shelves, shall not be construed to be
trafficking in pornography but special display
presentations of pornography in said places is sex
discrimination.
(2) The formation of private clubs or associations for
purposes of trafficking in pornography is illegal and
shall be considered a conspiracy to violate the civil
rights of women.
(3) Any woman has a cause of action hereunder as a
woman acting against the subordination of women.
Any man or transsexual who alleges injury by
pornography in the way women are injured by it shall
also have a cause of action.
(m) Coercion into pornographic performances. Any
person, including transsexual, who is coerced,
intimidated, or fraudulently induced (hereafter
“coerced”) into performing for pornography shall have a
cause of action against the maker(s), seller(s),
exhibitor(s) or distributor(s) of said pornography for
damages and for the elimination of the products of the
performance(s) from the public view.
(1) Limitation of action. This claim shall not expire
before five years have elapsed from the date of the
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coerced performance(s) or from the last appearance
or sale of any product of the performance(s),
whichever date is later;
(2) Proof of one or more of the following facts or
conditions shall not, without more, negate a finding
of coercion;
(i) that the person is a woman; or
(ii) that the person is or has been a prostitute; or
(iii) that the person has attained the age of
majority; or
(iv) that the person is connected by blood or
marriage to anyone involved in or related to the
making of the pornography; or
(v) that the person has previously had, or been
thought to have had, sexual relations with
anyone, including anyone involved in or related
to the making of the pornography; or
(vi) that the person has previously posed for
sexually explicit pictures for or with anyone,
including anyone involved in or related to the
making of the pornography at issue; or
(vii) that anyone else, including a spouse or
other relative, has given permission on the
person’s behalf; or
(viii) that the person actually consented to a use
of the performance that is changed into
pornography; or
(ix) that the person knew that the purpose of the
acts or events in question was to make
pornography; or
(x) that the person showed no resistance or
appeared to cooperate actively in the
photographic sessions or in the sexual events
that produced the pornography; or
(xi) that the person signed a contract, or made
statements affirming a willingness to cooperate
in the production of pornography; or
(xii) that no physical force, threats, or weapons
were used in the making of the pornography; or
(xiii) that the person was paid or otherwise
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compensated.
(n) Forcing pornography on a person. Any woman, man,
child, or transsexual who has pornography forced on
him/her in any place of employment, in education, in a
home, or in any public place has a cause of action against
the perpetrator and/or institution.
(o) Assault or physical attack due to pornography. Any
woman, man, child, or transsexual who is assaulted,
physically attacked or injured in a way that is directly
caused by specific pornography has a claim for damages
against the perpetrator, the maker(s), distributor(s),
seller(s), and/or exhibitor(s), and for an injunction
against the specific pornography’s further exhibition,
distribution, or sale. No damages shall be assessed (A)
against maker(s) for pornography made, (B) against
distributor(s) for pornography distributed, (C) against
seller(s) for pornography sold, or (D) against exhibitors
for pornography exhibited prior to the enforcement date
of this act.
(p) Defenses. Where the materials which are the subject
matter of a cause of action under subsections (l), (m),
(n), or (o) of this section are pornography, it shall not be
a defense that the defendants did not know or intend that
the materials were pornography or sex discrimination.
(q) Severability. Should any part(s) of this ordinance be
found legally invalid, the remaining part(s) remain valid.
(r) Subsections (l), (m), (n), and (o) of this section are
exceptions to the second clause of Section 141.90 of this
title.
(s) Effective date. Enforcement of this ordinance of
December 30, 1983, shall be suspended until July 1, 1984
(“enforcement date”) to facilitate training, education,
voluntary compliance, and implementation taking into
consideration the opinions of the City Attorney and the
Civil Rights Commission. No liability shall attach under (l)
or as specifically provided in the second sentence of (o)
until the enforcement date. Liability under all other
sections of this act shall attach as of December 30, 1983.
Amending Title 7, Chapter 141 of the Minneapolis Code of
Ordinances relating to Civil Rights: Administration and
Enforcement.
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The City Council of the City of Minneapolis do ordain as
follows:
Section 1. That Section 141.50 (l) of the above-entitled
ordinance be amended by adding thereto a new
subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) Pornography: The hearing committee or court
may order relief, including the removal of violative
material, permanent injunction against the sale,
exhibition or distribution of violative material, or any
other relief deemed just and equitable, including
reasonable attorney’s fees.
Section 2. That Section 141.60 of the above-entitled
ordinance be amended as follows:
141.60 Civil action, judicial review and enforcement.
(a)Civil actions.
(1)AN INDIVIDUAL ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF
THIS ORDINANCE MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION
DIRECTLY IN COURT.
(2) A complaint may bring a civil action at the
following times:
(i) Within forty-five (45) days after the director, a
review committee or a hearing committee has
dismissed a complaint for reasons other than
conciliation
agreement
to
which
the
complainant is a signator; or
(ii) After forty-five (45) days from the filing of a
verified complaint if a hearing has not been held
pursuant to section 141.50 or the department
has not entered into a conciliation agreement to
which the complainant is a signator. The
complainant shall notify the department of
his/her intention to bring a civil action, which
shall be commenced within ninety (90) days of
giving the notice. A complainant bringing a civil
action shall mail, by registered or certified mail,
a copy of the summons and complaint to the
department and upon receipt of same, the
director shall terminate all proceedings before
the department relating to the complaint and
shall dismiss the complaint.
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No complaint shall be filed or reinstituted with
the department after a civil action relating to the
same unfair discriminatory practice has been
brought unless the civil action has been
dismissed without prejudice.
GOVT OPS – Your Committee, to whom was
referred ordinances amending Title 7 of the
Minneapolis Code of Ordinances, to add
pornography as discrimination against women
and provide just and equitable relief upon
finding of discrimination by hearing committee
of the Civil Rights Commission, and having held
public hearings thereon, recommends that the
following ordinances be given their second
readings for amendment and passage:
a. Ordinance amending Chap 139 relating to Civil Rights:
In General;
b. Ordinance amending Chap 141 relating to Civil Rights:
Administration and Enforcement.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., PROPOSED ORDINANCE 83-Or-323
(1983) (Vetoed by Mayor Fraser on Jan. 1, 1984).
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